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Abstract—Bitcoin cryptocurrency system enables users to
transact securely and pseudo-anonymously by using an arbitrary
number of aliases (Bitcoin addresses). Cybercriminals exploit
these characteristics to commit immutable and presumably un-
traceable monetary fraud, especially via ransomware; a type of
malware that encrypts files of the infected system and demands
ransom for decryption.
In this paper, we present our comprehensive study on all
recent ransomware and report the economic impact of such
ransomware from the Bitcoin payment perspective. We also
present a lightweight framework to identify, collect, and analyze
Bitcoin addresses managed by the same user or group of users
(cybercriminals, in this case), which includes a novel approach
for classifying a payment as ransom. To verify the correctness
of our framework, we compared our findings on CryptoLocker
ransomware with the results presented in the literature. Our
results align with the results found in the previous works except
for the final valuation in USD. The reason for this discrepancy is
that we used the average Bitcoin price on the day of each ransom
payment whereas the authors of the previous studies used the
Bitcoin price on the day of their evaluation. Furthermore, for
each investigated ransomware, we provide a holistic view of its
genesis, development, the process of infection and execution, and
characteristic of ransom demands. Finally, we also release our
dataset that contains a detailed transaction history of all the
Bitcoin addresses we identified for each ransomware.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency, Distributed Ledger,
Payment, Ransomware, Transaction
I. INTRODUCTION
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 proposed a decentralized
cryptography-based electronic currency called Bitcoin [1].
Such financial systems eliminate the control of centralized
authority and provide ubiquity as well as fairness via (quasi)
real-time transactions. Such digital currencies also guarantee
a certain degree of anonymity, which raises novel and unique
concerns, e.g., an inevitable-growth in illegal activities.
On another side, ransomware is a class of malware that
restricts access to the system it infects until the victim pays
the demanded ransom. Readily available toolkits such as eda21
and Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) enable even a novice
user to create and launch ransomware. Furthermore, the ran-
somware affiliate program lures users to spread ransomware
in exchange for profit share. According to the annual threat
* Corresponding author
M. Conti and A. Gangwal are with the Department of Mathematics,
University of Padua, 35121, Padua, Italy (e-mail: conti@math.unipd.it;
ankit.gangwal@phd.unipd.it).
Sushmita Ruj is with Cryptology and Security Research Unit, Computer
and Communication Sciences Division, Indian Statistical Institute, 700108,
Kolkata, India (e-mail: sush@isical.ac.in).
1eda2 is an abandoned open-source ransomware kit that was distributed
only for educational purposes.
report-2017 published by Symantec Inc. [2], ransomware
continued to be the most dangerous cyber-crime threat to
individual users and enterprises in 2016. Compared to the
previous year, the number of detected ransomware infection
increased by 36% during 2016. Moreover, average ransomware
detection rate reached over 1,500 incidents per day at the year-
end. In particular, the average ransom amount rose 266% from
USD 294 in 2015 to USD 1,077.
The evolving class of ransomware has been exploiting
privacy-preserving online services, e.g., the Tor hidden net-
work [3] to remain anonymous. Moreover, the pseudo-
anonymous nature of decentralized currencies such as Bitcoin
makes it difficult to trace a payee. Hence, the cybercrim-
inals have been misusing such payment systems to extort
ransoms anonymously. In this paper, we present our com-
prehensive and longitudinal study on recent ransomware and
report the economic impact of such ransomware from the
Bitcoin payment perspective.
Contributions: The major contributions of this paper are
listed as follows:
1) We present a lightweight framework to identify, collect,
and analyze addresses that belong to the same user.
We also propose a novel approach for classifying a
payment as ransom.
2) Using our framework, we analyzed the economic impact
(in terms of ransoms extorted in Bitcoin) of all the recent
ransomware: (i) that used Bitcoin as at least one mode of
ransom payment, and (ii) for which at least one Bitcoin
address is publicly known.
3) We discuss the inception, evolution (where applicable),
and functionality (including distribution, infection, and
encryption procedure) of every analyzed ransomware
along with the magnitude and timeline of their ransom
demands.
4) We also release our dataset2 for future research endeav-
ors. The dataset contains a detailed transaction history
of all the addresses we identified for each ransomware.
Hence, our results are fully reproducible.
Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we explain the essential concepts related
to ransomware infection and the Bitcoin currency system.
Section III addresses the previous works on identification and
assessment of cyber-crimes in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Sec-
tion IV elucidates our framework for ransom identification. In
Section V, we present our findings and enlighten the economic
impact the ransomware that fulfilled our selection criteria.
2spritz.math.unipd.it/projects/btcransomware/
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2In Section VI, we discuss the limitations of our proposed
framework. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the chronology of a typical
ransomware infection and explain the fundamentals of the
Bitcoin cryptocurrency system.
Ransomware: A typical ransomware infection includes the
following events:
1) Infection: Similar to generic malware, ransomware are
also distributed via various infection vectors. These vec-
tors include, but not limited to, email spamming with
malicious attachment (e.g., CryptoLocker) or link to
the malicious payload (e.g., CryptoWall), exploit packs
(e.g., Angler browser exploit in TeslaCrypt and Neu-
trino exploit kit in DMA Locker). Interestingly, recent
ransomware incorporate self-propagation capabilities. For
instance, NotPetya and WannaCry exploit vulnerabilities
in the network protocols to infect local computers on
the same network.
2) Encryption: After infiltration, ransomware silently en-
crypt files on the infected system. In particular, ran-
somware target those files that are valuable to the user,
e.g., images, videos, documents. For the encryption pro-
cess, ransomware use symmetric encryption algorithm,
asymmetric encryption algorithm, or even combination
of the both. The key for encryption is either generated
locally or procured from a remote Command and Con-
trol (C&C). Generally, the backup files are also en-
crypted/deleted to prevent recovery. However, the files
responsible for running the system are not affected, at
least until the deadline for the ransom payment.
3) Extortion: After the encryption process, ransomware dis-
play a ransom note on the screen. The ransom note of
recent ransomware includes a threat message, ransom
amount specified in fiat currency such as US dollar (for
instance, USD 300 in NotPetya) or cryptocurrency such
as Bitcoin (for instance, 1 BTC in CryptoLocker), a
countdown timer that shows the time left before the
deadline, and a payment address. The payment address
can be a Bitcoin address or a website’s address that shows
this Bitcoin address. Typically, the ransom note also
includes instructions on how and where to buy Bitcoin.
4) Decryption: After confirmation of the ransom payment,
the ransomware either automatically start the decryption
process, or the victim is asked to download and run
a decryption tool.
Bitcoin: In 1993, researchers from Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity [4] and University of Southern California [5] dis-
cussed the need for a cryptography-based digital currency. On
November 1, 2008, a person or a group of persons under a
pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto articulated the idea of peer-
to-peer, decentralized, cryptography-based electronic currency
system called Bitcoin [1]. The basic terminology used in the
Bitcoin protocol are as follows:
• Address: A Bitcoin address is a string identifier of a pos-
sible destination for a Bitcoin payment. It is 26 to 35 al-
phanumeric characters long and begins with the num-
ber 1 (Pay-to-Pub KeyHash or P2PKH type) or 3 (Pay to
Script Hash or P2SH type). Bitcoin addresses are hashed
public keys generated from the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Hence, each Bitcoin is
associated with the owner’s public key.
• Wallet: A wallet is a file that stores Bitcoin addresses
along with the corresponding private keys. It also main-
tains the Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) corre-
sponding to each address.
• Blockchain: The blockchain is a shared, public ledger on
which the entire Bitcoin network relies. All confirmed
transactions are included in the blockchain without any
exception. This way, new transactions can be verified
to be spending Bitcoin that are indeed owned by the
spender. The integrity and the chronological order of the
blockchain are enforced with cryptography.3
• Block: An individual unit of the blockchain is called a
block. Each block includes the hash of the previous block
to guarantee the integrity of the network, the nonce that
assisted its mining, and a list of the transactions.
• Transaction: A transaction refers to a transfer of Bitcoin
between Bitcoin addresses. To transfer Bitcoin, a payer
creates a transaction message. In this message, the payer
specifies the payee’s Bitcoin address as well as an amount
of Bitcoin to transfer. As shown in Figure 1, the payer
authenticates the transaction by digitally signing it with
the private key of the corresponding address. Finally,
Bitcoin network broadcasts and confirms (typically, in the
following 10 minutes) the transaction through a process
called mining. A confirmed transaction is irreversible.
Digital signPayer Public keyPayer
Transaction
OutInN BTCAddrPayer
N BTC
AddrPayee
Figure 1: An example of a simple Bitcoin transaction
A user can also purchase Bitcoin in exchange for other
regulated currencies. The unit of the Bitcoin currency is
“Bitcoin,” abbreviated as “BTC.” Like any other traded com-
modity, the price4 of Bitcoin varies. Figure 2 depicts the
BTC-USD exchange rate since July 18, 2010, the day when
one of the world’s first Bitcoin currency exchange market
Mt. Gox was established.
3bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works
4We use the term “price” to refer BTC-USD exchange rate.
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Figure 2: BTC-USD exchange rate trend
III. RELATED WORK
Law enforcement authorities as well as the research commu-
nity have made several attempts to identify and measure cyber-
crimes in the Bitcoin ecosystem. The authors in [6–9] pro-
posed tools to analyze transactions in the Bitcoin blockchain
visually. Christin in [10] proposed a thorough analysis of
the Silk Road anonymous marketplace and discussed the
socio-economic implications of the findings. Ron and Shamir
used the public blockchain data to estimate the wealth of
the Silk Road marketplace’s owner, known as Dread Pirate
Robert [11]. Soska and Christin studied anonymous online
marketplaces including Silk Road, Sheep Marketplace, etc.
and examined how virtual marketplaces have evolved [12].
Meiklejohn et al. [13] proposed an approach to comprehend
overall transaction patterns of the Bitcoin payments used for
criminal or fraudulent purposes.
However, the literature on measuring the economic im-
pact of ransomware that accepted ransoms via Bitcoin (here-
inafter referred to as “Bitcoin ransomware”) is rather limited.
Huang et al. [14] discuss the ethical and technical issues of
monitoring ransomware activities as well as the dynamics of
ransom payments. Liao et al. [15] analyzed the timestamps of
ransom payments to CryptoLocker. The work [16] provides
a holistic view of the general ransomware that appeared be-
tween 2006 and 2014. Additionally, the authors also estimated
the financial intensives gained by CyptoLocker ransomware.
Spagnuolo et al. proposed a framework called BitIodine [17].
The authors used BitIodine to investigate Bitcoin addresses
associated with CryptoLocker ransomware and Dread Pirate
Roberts. The works [18, 19] present a systematic analysis of
CryptoLocker ransomware.
It is noteworthy that previous works [15–19] only consid-
ered either the daily average or highest Bitcoin price to classify
ransom payments and do not take into account the variations
that might occur due to the transaction fee. Furthermore,
their estimation of the total worth of extorted ransoms is
based on the Bitcoin price on the day of their evaluation,
which exaggerates the results due to fluctuations (mostly,
increase; see Figure 2) in the price of Bitcoin. Additionally,
the systems proposed in the previous works [6–9, 17] demand
high bandwidth, storage, and computational resources as they
query the entire blockchain.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first study
that elaborates not only the characteristics and functionality of
various Bitcoin ransomware, but it also gives more accurate
insights on the economic impact of such ransomware. In
particular, our work is different from the state-of-the-art on
various dimensions: (i) to identify a payment as ransom,
we consider both the day-to-day lowest and highest Bitcoin
price as well as the variations due to the transaction fee;
(ii) to accurately assess the worth (in USD) of extorted
ransoms, we used the average Bitcoin price on the day of each
ransom payment; and (iii) our framework focuses only on the
transactions belonging to the address(es) of interest rather than
the entire blockchain.
IV. RANSOM IDENTIFICATION FRAMEWORK
To investigate the ransoms extorted by a ransomware, we
first identify the Bitcoin addresses linked to the ransomware.
Then, we obtain the transaction history of these addresses.
Finally, we distinguish the transactions associated with the
ransom payments. To this end, we propose our framework,
which consists of three stages/parts/modules: (i) identifying
the Bitcoin addresses belonging to the ransomware (discussed
in Section IV-A); (ii) data (transaction history) collection and
database generation from the blockchain (presented in Sec-
tion IV-B); and (iii) our considerations for classifying a
payment as ransom (elaborated in Section IV-C).
A. Module1: Identification of ransomware addresses
Bitcoin offers privacy only through pseudonymity, and an
increasing number of works [9, 11–13, 20, 21] suggest that
information available in public blockchain ledger can lead to
de-anonymize (to a certain extent) Bitcoin transactions.
To collect the addresses associated with a ransomware, we
began by extensively searching various online resources: ran-
somware knowledge base (e.g., ESET, Kaspersky Lab, Mal-
warebytes, Symantec); ransomware removal guides (e.g.,
BleepingComputer.com, MalwareTips.com, 2-spyware.com,
“How To” videos on YouTube); reports from Counter Threat
Units (CTU), Incident Responses (IR), and Security Opera-
tions Centers (SOC) (e.g., Dell SecureWorks, PhishMe.com);
online fora (e.g., Reddit) where victims and researchers post
4Bitcoin addresses associated with the concerned ransomware;
and screenshots of ransomware available in different image
search engines (e.g., Google, Yahoo). Considering the fact that
not every address related to a ransomware is posted on the
Internet, we used two clustering heuristics to identify the set of
addresses controlled by the same user (cybercriminals, in our
case). Our heuristics are based on the fundamental principles
of the Bitcoin transaction protocol [1] and are as follows:
1) Multi-input transactions: A multi-input transaction usu-
ally5 takes place when a user U attempts to make a payment,
and the payment amount P cannot be sufficiently funded by
any of the individual Bitcoin balance available in U’s wallet.
In such a scenario, the Bitcoin protocol allows grouping of
a set of Bitcoin balances from U’s wallet to settle P and
make payment through a multi-input transaction. Hence, we
can conclude that if a set of input addresses Sinput is used to
disburse P, then Sinput is managed by the same user.
2) Shadow/change address: In the Bitcoin protocol, the
whole input amount must be spent in the same transaction.
To deliver the “change” back to the user U, a shadow ad-
dress Ashadow is automatically generated and used to collect
the unspent amount of the transaction. If there are two ad-
dresses in the set of output addresses Sout , and one address
has never been seen before in the whole blockchain while the
other address has appeared before, then we can safely presume
that the newly generated address is a shadow address [13].
Algorithm 1 explains our approach to identify the addresses
managed by the same user, hereinafter referred to as “Cluster”.
Here, Sinitial represents the set of addresses collected from the
online resources, Sinput is a set of input addresses in a trans-
action, and Ashadow represents a shadow address generated (if
any) in a transaction.
Algorithm 1 Identifying addresses managed by the same user.
Input: Sinitial
1: Cluster := Sinitial
2: Cluster ′ := {} . { } is an empty set
3: while Cluster , Cluster ′ do
4: Cluster ′ := Cluster
5: M := {} . M stores Sinput
6: C := {} . C stores Ashadow
7: for i in Cluster do
8: Get all transactions T x where i is an input address
9: for t in T x do
10: M ∪ (Sinput in t) . ∪ is set union
11: C ∪ (Ashadow in t)
12: end for
13: end for
14: Cluster := Cluster ∪ M ∪ C
15: end while
16: return Cluster
Essentially, for a given list of addresses, our algorithm
recursively finds all the addresses satisfying our heuristics.
5Nowadays, coin mixing services allow users to join their transactions
to enhance anonymity and unlinkability. However, such services have many
security and privacy concerns [22]. Hence, for simplicity, we assume that the
user commonly does not make use of Bitcoin mixers.
B. Module2: Data collection and database generation
As explained in Section II, Bitcoin blockchain data is
publicly available. At the time of writing (December 2017),
block height of the blockchain was over 500,000 blocks, which
means that downloading/querying the entire blockchain is very
expensive in terms of bandwidth, storage, and computations.
To address these issues, we built a lightweight system that
uses Blockchain Data API6 to crawl and parse transactions
associated only with the address(es) of interest.
For each transaction associated with an address of inter-
est (Address), our system collects the hash of the transac-
tion (HASH), remitted Bitcoin (BTC to Addr), input address-
es (Trx In Addrs), output addresses (Trx Out Addrs), GMT-
based date (GMT Date), and GMT-based time (GMT Time).
Listing 1 shows the SQL statement used to create our database.
CREATE TABLE tx (
HASH CHAR(64) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
BTC_to_Addr INT NOT NULL,
Trx_In_Addrs TEXT,
Trx_Out_Addrs TEXT,
GMT_Date DATE,
GMT_Time Time,
Address CHAR(35) NOT NULL,
Address_as_Input INT NOT NULL
);
Listing 1: SQL statement for creating our database
The field HASH serves as the Primary Key, which implicitly
discards any duplicate transactions reported for multiple par-
ticipating/constituting addresses. Address as Input denotes if
the Address was used as an input in the transaction. Our system
also uses BitcoinAverage API7 to collect day-to-day highest,
average, and lowest price of Bitcoin.
C. Module3: Considerations for classifying a payment as
ransom
A Bitcoin transaction involves two varying factors: (i) Bit-
coin price, and (ii) transaction fee. The price of Bitcoin
changes frequently. Therefore, considering only the daily
average, highest, or lowest price of Bitcoin is not suitable,
especially when the variation in the price is high. Furthermore,
the transaction fee is paid on the top of the transaction amount.
A victim may assume that the ransom amount to be paid
includes (or excludes) the transaction fee, which leads to
discrepancies in the payment-amount transferred to an address.
Moreover, the transaction fee depends on the size of the
transaction, i.e., a transaction that involves a larger number
of addresses would incur more fee than a transaction with
fewer addresses involved. Hence, to classify a payment as
ransom, our framework considers both the day-to-day lowest
and highest price of Bitcoin as well as the variation that might
occur due to the transaction fee.
6blockchain.info/api/blockchain api
7apiv2.bitcoinaverage.com
5In general, the cybercriminals specify the ransom either in
Bitcoin (e.g., 1 BTC) or USD equivalent BTC (e.g., Bitcoin
equivalent to USD 300). Our framework classifies a payment
ρ to an address α in a transaction τ as ransom if it satisfies
at least one condition in Eq. (1a) or Eq. (1b).
demand in =

BTC =
{
rb = db,
rb = db − f ,
USD =
{
vl ≤ du ≤ vh,
vl ≤ du − f ≤ vh,
(1a)
(1b)
where:
• f denotes the transaction fee, computed as the difference
between the total amount being spent and the total amount
being received in τ.
• db denotes the ransom asked in BTC.
• du denotes the ransom asked in USD.
• rb denotes the BTC received by α in ρ.
• vl denotes the value of rb computed using the lowest
BTC price of the payment day.
• vh denotes the value of rb computed using the highest
BTC price of the payment day.
It is also important to mention that to evaluate the total
ransom (in USD) received by a ransomware cluster, it would
be unfair to use the Bitcoin price on the day of our evaluation
as it would misrepresent the amount due to the variations in
the price. Hence, unlike previous works, we used the average
Bitcoin price on the day of each ransom payment.
V. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RANSOMWARE
We found twenty ransomware that fulfilled our selection
criteria, i.e., those ransomware: (i) that used Bitcoin as at
least one mode of ransom payment, and (ii) for which at least
one Bitcoin address is publicly known. In this section, we
discuss these twenty ransomware and their renamed/rebranded
versions. Here, our main focus is to provide an insight into
the economic impact of these ransomware from the Bitcoin
payment perspective. Figure 3 depicts the reported debut
period of these ransomware as well as the occurrence of their
renamed/rebranded versions.
We performed the numerical assessment of the ransomware
on December 7, 2017. Hence, all the data reported in this
paper include the transactions until December 7, 2017. We
begin with those ransomware for which the observed payments
align with their period of activity and ransom demands. Table I
presents a summary of overall payments received by the
addresses of such ransomware. It also lists the payments
classified as ransom by our framework. Furthermore, for
each payment class, it includes equivalent BTC/USD value
(using day-to-day average Bitcoin price). It is clear that
CryptoLocker received the maximum number of payments,
i.e., 51,766 payments that worth 133,045.9961 BTC, which
is approximately USD 42,292,191.17. However, our frame-
work classified 3,730 payments received by CryptoWall as
ransom payments, which is the maximum number of ransom
payments extorted by any ransomware. These payments worth
5,351.2329 BTC or USD 2,220,909.12. On another side,
KeRanger received the minimum number of overall payments
as well as the ransom payments. Now, we discuss each
ransomware in details.
A. CryptoLocker
Introduction: Appeared in September 2013, CryptoLocker
targets computers running Windows operating system. It
uses “Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic
Provider (MS ENH RSA AES PROV)” to create encryp-
tion keys and to encrypt users’ files with the strong
RSA (CALG RSA KEYX) and AES (CALG AES 256) al-
gorithms. Before beginning the encryption process, it estab-
lishes a connection with its C&C to obtain an RSA public
key. It encrypts each file with a unique AES key; after use,
it encrypts each AES encryption key with the RSA public
key [18].
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Figure 3: Occurrence of Bitcoin ransomware
Ransomware Overall RansomPayments BTC USD Value Payments BTC USD value
CryptoLocker 51,766 133,045.9961 42,292,191.17 804 1403.7548 449,274.97
CryptoDefense 128 138.3223 70,113.41 108 126.6960 63,859.49
CryptoWall 51,278 87,897.8510 45,370,589.00 3,730 5,351.2329 2,220,909.12
DMA Locker 298 1,433.3463 580,763.95 117 339.4591 178,162.77
NotPetya 70 4.1787 10,284.42 33 4.0576 9,835.86
KeRanger 13 10.0044 4,175.35 10 9.9990 4,173.12
WannaCry 341 53.2906 99,549.05 238 47.1743 86,076.76
Table I: Summary of overall payments and ransom payments to the ransomware for which the observed payments align with
their period of activity and ransom demands
6Infection: CryptoLocker infection spread through two
modes. In its initial release beginning from September 5, 2013,
the cybercriminals especially targeted business professionals
through spam emails. The messages of the emails were typical
“customer complaints” against recipients’ firm. Attached to
these emails was a ZIP archive that contained a single mali-
cious Windows executable (exe) file. The names of both the
ZIP file and malicious executable were identical (except for ex-
tensions) with 13 to 17 random alphabetical characters. Later
versions of CryptoLocker, starting from October 7, 2013, were
distributed by the peer-to-peer (P2P) Gameover ZeuS [23]. In
this case, Gameover Zeus used Cutwail spam botnet to send a
huge number of spam emails miming popular online retailers
and banking institutions. These emails often contained spoofed
order confirmations, invoices, or urgent message for unpaid
balances to entice victims to follow CryptoLocker exploit kits.
Ransom demand: The ransom note asks the victim to pay
the ransom within 72 hours through any one of the various
payment methods. It also threatens that not paying the ransom
would lead to (allegedly) destruction of decryption keys. In the
initial versions, the payment option included cashU8, Ukash9,
paysafecard10, Bitcoin, or MoneyPak11. However, later the
ransoms were collected only via Bitcoin or MoneyPak. All
these payments methods are anonymous (or at least pseudo-
anonymous), which makes it difficult to track the payer and
the payee. The amount of demanded ransom and their corre-
sponding timelines (both the dates are included) are as follow:
• 2 BTC between September 5, 2013 and Novem-
ber 11, 2013 allowing a three-day ransom period.
• 10 BTC between November 1, 2013 and Novem-
ber 11, 2013. The payment was the fee for using “Cryp-
toLocker Decryption Service” that allowed victims, who
failed to pay ransoms within the given time frame, to
recover their files.
• 1 BTC between November 8, 2013 and Novem-
ber 13, 2013 to allowing a three-day ransom period.
• 0.5 BTC between November 10, 2013 and Novem-
ber 27, 2013 to allowing a three-day ransom period.
• 2 BTC between November 11, 2013 and Jan-
uary 31, 2014. In this case, the payment was the reduced
fee for using “CryptoLocker Decryption Service”.
• 0.3 BTC between November 24, 2013 and Decem-
ber 31, 2013.
• 0.6 BTC between December 20, 2013 and Jan-
uary 31, 2014.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: To evaluate
the economic impact of CryptoLocker, we initially began
with four Bitcoin addresses listed in Table A.1. Using these
addresses, Module1 (Section IV-A) generated 956 addresses
belonging to CryptoLocker cluster (CCL). We obtained the
detailed transaction history of these addresses using Mod-
ule2 (Section IV-B). Our analysis of transactions to CCL re-
veals that CCL received, in total, over 51,000 payments, which
8www.cashu.com
9www.ukash.com
10www.paysafecard.com
11www.attheregister.com/moneypak/
accounts for over 133,000 BTC (more than USD 42,000,000).
Table II presents a summary of the total payments credited to
CCL .
Payments BTC
USD valuez
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
51,766 133,045.9961 42,722,858.15 42,292,191.17 41,734,959.83
Table II: Total payments credited to CCL including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: To evaluate the
gross economic impact of only the ransom payments, we
filtered the transactions using: (i) the ransom amounts and
their timeline, (ii) our classification criteria mentioned in
Module3 (Section IV-C). Figure 4 shows the total number of
ransoms paid by the victims by date. CCL received 33 payment
on October 10, 2013, which is the maximum number of ran-
soms paid in a single day. However, as shown in Figure 5, CCL
received slightly more than 70 BTC on November 5, 2013,
which is the maximum number of Bitcoin received in a single
day. On another side, CCL received slightly above USD 23,000
on November 8, 2013, which is the maximum USD collected
in a single day, see Figure 6.
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Figure 4: Number of ransoms paid to CCL
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Figure 6: USD value of ransoms paid to CCL
By further analyzing the addresses of CCL , we discovered
that approximately 83.16% Bitcoin addresses received max-
imum two payments. Moreover, 13.33% Bitcoin addresses
received no more than one Bitcoin perhaps because victims
were charged less due to a substantial increase in the Bitcoin
value in late November 2013. Moreover, an address12 collected
112.94 BTC while a different address13 collected 83 ransom
payments. These values correspond to the maximum number
of Bitcoin and the maximum number of ransom collected by
any address in CCL . Figures 7 and 8 depict Cumulative Distri-
bution Function (CDF) of the number of ransoms and number
of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) per address respectively.
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Figure 7: CDF of ransoms received per address in CCL
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Figure 8: CDF of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) per address
in CCL
In total, we have identified 804 ransom payments to CCL ,
which contribute to a total of 1,403.75 extorted BTC. Using
1216i7w5G2aoq8zqLDR3VJnawZ8VmYFZjVsd
131HFLn7JP7FZrufvNKkQPEfAWGjKUdFZEmy
day-to-day average Bitcoin price, we estimate that these ran-
soms convert to USD 449,274.97. Table III summarizes the
ransoms paid to CryptoLocker.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
2 BTC Sep. 05, ’13 - Nov. 11, ’13 443 884.9691 153,650.51
10 BTC (late) Nov. 01, ’13 - Nov. 11, ’13 17 170.0000 47,549.90
1 BTC Nov. 08, ’13 - Nov. 13, ’13 38 38.0000 14,302.26
0.5 BTC Nov. 10, ’13 - Nov. 27, ’13 118 59.0000 37,108.27
2 BTC (late) Nov. 11, ’13 - Jan. 31, ’14 106 212.0000 166,476.42
0.3 BTC Nov. 24, ’13 - Dec. 31, ’13 31 9.1856 8,584.88
0.6 BTC Dec. 20, ’13 - Jan. 30, ’14 51 30.6000 21,602.72
Total Sep. 05, ’13 - Jan. 30, ’14 804 1403.7548 449,274.97
Table III: Summary of ransoms paid to CryptoLocker
Although we cannot be sure that the unaccounted trans-
actions are not ransom payments, our results align with the
findings presented in the works [15, 17–19] except for the
final valuation in USD since the authors of these studies
used the Bitcoin price on the day of their evaluation. More
importantly, it implies that we can trust our methodology for
evaluating other ransomware where a baseline for comparison
is not available.
B. CryptoDefense
Introduction: With a sophisticated hybrid design, Cryp-
toDefense first appeared in the last week of February 2014.
It incorporates many powerful techniques that were used
by previous ransomware. For example, use of Bitcoin and
the Tor network for anonymity, RSA-2048 based public-key
cryptography for strong encryption, and the typical pressure
tactics such as a short deadline for payment with threats of
increasing the ransom after the deadline. It targets Windows
systems. CryptoDefense encrypts files using the AES-256
algorithm. It generates the encryption key on the victim’s
computer using Windows CryptoAPI library. After the file
encryption process completes, it encrypts the AES key using
an RSA-2048 public key.
Infection: Primarily, CryptoDefense ransomware infiltrated
via spam emails that contained malicious payload disguised
as a compressed PDF document. Upon successful infiltration,
it attempts to contact its C&C; and it sends the information
about the infected system in the initial communication. Upon
receiving the acknowledgment from the C&C, it starts the
encryption process.
Ransom demand: CryptoDefense asks USD/EUR 500 in
Bitcoin within four days to decrypt the files. The cost of
decryption after four days increases to USD/EUR 1,000. The
attackers also provide a unique .onion page for each victim.
Here, the victims could see a screenshot of their compromised
system and decrypt one file as a proof of decryption.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: We be-
gan with two publicly known Bitcoin payment addresses
of CryptoDefense. These addresses are listed in Table A.2.
In our analysis, the CryptoDefense cluster (CCD) had only
two addresses as Module1 generates no new address from
these addresses. Our analysis of transactions (obtained using
Module2) to CCD indicates that CCD collected 128 payments.
The total value of these payments is somewhat above 138 BTC
(more than USD 70,000). Table IV presents a summary of the
total payments credited to CCD .
8Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
128 138.3223 72,342.26 70,113.41 67,715.88
Table IV: Total payments credited to CCD including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: Due to the limited
number of transactions, we manually verified each payment to
CCD . As shown in Table V, each Bitcoin address collected at
minimum 35 ransom payments and a minimum of about 36.83
BTC.
Address Payments BTC
19DyWHtgLgDKgEeoKjfpCJJ9WU8SQ3gr27 35 36.8339
1EmLLj8peW292zR2VvumYPPa9wLcK4CPK1 73 89.8622
Table V: Number of ransoms and Bitcoin received (in
ransoms) per address in CCD
Figure 9 shows the total number of ransoms paid, and
Figures 10 and 11 depict the corresponding number of Bitcoin
received and their value in USD. Figures 9, 10, and 11 also
depict that on March 28, 2014, CCD collected around 13 BTC
in 11 ransom payments, which amounts to approximately
USD 6,500. It is the day when it received the maximum
number of ransom payments/Bitcoin/USD in a single day.
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Figure 9: Number of ransoms paid to CCD
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Figure 10: Number of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) by CCD
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Figure 11: USD value of ransoms paid to CCD
In total, we have distinguished 108 ransom payments to
CCD , which corresponds to 126.70 extorted BTC. Using day-
to-day average Bitcoin price, we compute that the value
of these ransom payments is equivalent to USD 63,859.49.
Table VI summarizes the ransoms payments made to Cryp-
toDefense.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
$/e500
Feb. 28, ’14 - Apr. 11, ’14
94 96.1758 49,271.63
$/e1,000 14 30.5202 14,587.86
Total 108 126.6960 63,859.49
Table VI: Summary of ransoms paid to CryptoDefense
Unexpectedly, CryptoDefense has a built-in flaw. It gener-
ates the asymmetric key pair on the victim’s system. However,
due to the poor implementation of the Microsoft’s crypto-
graphic infrastructure, it leaves a local copy of the keys. Anti-
ransomware took advantage of this flaw to decrypt victim’s
computer. Such initiatives saved at least USD 175,000 worth
ransoms [24].
C. CryptoWall
Introduction: CryptoWall is recognized for its use of strong
encryption algorithm, unique .CHM file infection mechanism,
and strong C&C activity over the anonymous Tor network.
According to Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU)
research team [25], CryptoWall infection was spreading from
the first half of November 2013. However, the attackers
activated it in the first quarter of 2014. The earlier versions of
CryptoWall closely impersonated both the appearance and the
behavior of the CryptoLocker. CryptoWall affects Windows
operating systems by encrypting files using the RSA-2048
(and the AES-256 encryption algorithm from version 3.0)
encryption algorithm.
Infection: Since its genesis, CryptoWall had spread through
several infection vectors, which included drive-by downloads,
browser exploit kits (e.g., Angler), and email attachments.
Starting from late March 2014, it spread through download
links sent via the Cutwail spam botnet and malicious email at-
tachments. Interestingly, from June 2014, the malicious emails
included links to popular cloud services such as Dropbox,
MediaFire, and Cubby. The links pointed to a ZIP archive that
contained the CryptoWall executable. Later these emails used a
standard “missed fax” decoy and also mimicked message from
government agencies or financial institutions that included
links to malicious payload hosted over cloud services.
9Evolution: Each version of CryptoWall lasted for a few
months until a stealthier and enhanced version emerged.
• CryptoWall 1.0: Initial variants of CryptoWall lacked a
unique name. It surfaced with its official name in the
first quarter of 2014.
• CryptoWall 2.0: It appeared in November 2014. This
version was almost identical to the previous version.
However, unlike its predecessor, it creates a unique Bit-
coin payment address for each victim and uses its own
Web-2-Tor gateways.
• CryptoWall 3.0: The third version of CryptoWall emerged
in January 2015. This version uses a local symmetric
(AES-256) key for file encryption. The symmetric key
is then encrypted using a unique public (RSA-2048) key
generated by the C&C server. Such process of encryption
is much faster as compared to the previous versions.
• CryptoWall 4.0: Another updated version with improved
communications and better code design to exploit more
vulnerabilities appeared in November 2015.
Ransom demand: The attackers originally accepted ransom
payments through Litecoin [25]. However, the only witnessed
Litecoin address14 never collected any payment. Additionally,
the victims could also pay the ransom via Bitcoin. The amount
of ransom fluctuated frequently. Also, the time frame to
pay the ransom varied up to seven days. According to our
observation, the demanded ransom and their corresponding
timelines (both the dates are included) are as follow:
• $200 worth BTC between March 2, 2014 and Novem-
ber 4, 2015.
• $500 worth BTC between March 2, 2014 and Decem-
ber 22, 2015.
• Late payment of $600 worth BTC between March 5, 2014
and November 5, 2015. This payment was three times the
original ransom amount.
• Late payment of $1,000 worth BTC between
March 5, 2014 and December 2, 2015. This payment
was two times the original ransom amount.
• $700 worth BTC between March 10, 2014 and Decem-
ber 11, 2015.
• Late payment of $1,400 worth BTC between
March 11, 2014 and December 21, 2015. This payment
was two times the original ransom amount.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: We began
with forty-two publicly known Bitcoin addresses of Cryp-
toWall. These addresses are listed in Table A.3. Using these
addresses, Module1 generated 2,944 addresses belonging to
CryptoWall cluster (CCW ). Our analysis of transactions (ob-
tained using Module2) to CCW shows that CCW , in total,
received over 51,000 payments. The total worth of these
payments is nearly 88,000 BTC (more than USD 45,000,000).
Table VII presents a summary of the total payments credited
to CCW .
14LTv4m4y7NKHCXdw31dSEpTJmP6kXTinWDy
Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
51,278 87,897.8510 46,526,673.59 45,370,589.00 44,020,263.63
Table VII: Total payments credited to CCW including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: Using the timeline
of ransom demands, we carefully analyzed all the transactions
with Module3 to distinguish ransom payments and evaluated
the net worth generated by such payments. As shown in Fig-
ures 12, 13, and 14, on March 27, 2014, CCW received slightly
above 185 BTC in 158 payments. The total value of these
payments is over USD 100,000. It is the day when it received
the maximum number of ransom payments/Bitcoin/USD in
a single day.
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Figure 12: Number of ransoms paid to CCW
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Figure 14: USD value of ransoms paid to CCW
By investigating the addresses of CCW , we observed that
approximately 43.77% Bitcoin addresses received no more
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than one payment and 40.10% Bitcoin addresses collected
maximum two Bitcoin. On another side, an address15 col-
lected 193.94 BTC in 209 ransom payments. These values
correspond to the maximum number of Bitcoin and the max-
imum number of ransom collected by any address in CCW .
Figures 15 and 16 show the CDF of the number of ransoms
and the number of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) per address
respectively.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180 195 210
N
o.
 o
f r
an
so
m
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 p
er
 a
dd
re
ss
 (C
D
F)
No. of ransoms received
Figure 15: CDF of ransoms received per address in CCW
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Figure 16: CDF of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) per address
in CCW
We have identified 3,730 ransom payments to CCW , which
amount to 5,351.23 extorted BTC. Using day-to-day average
Bitcoin price, we calculate that these ransom payments are
equivalent to USD 2,220,909.12. Table VIII summarizes the
ransoms paid to CryptoWall.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
$200 Mar. 02, ’14 - Nov. 04, ’15 614 232.3343 121,849.84
$500 Mar. 02, ’14 - Dec. 22, ’15 1,631 2220.9167 821,741.46
$600 (late) Mar. 05, ’14 - Nov. 05, ’15 382 444.5144 226,558.14
$1,000 (late) Mar. 05, ’14 - Dec. 02, ’15 423 836.5054 422,576.75
$700 Mar. 10, ’14 - Dec. 11, ’15 466 966.7365 327,518.98
$1,400 (late) Mar. 11, ’14 - Dec. 21, ’15 214 650.2256 300,663.95
Total Mar. 02, ’14 - Dec. 22, ’15 3,730 5,351.2329 2,220,909.12
Table VIII: Summary of ransoms paid to CryptoWall
Moreover, according to the report by CTU researchers [25],
CryptoWall attackers allowed the victims to decrypt their
system by paying a further increased amount even after the
expired deadline. Although, we have not directly observed
any sample of CryptoWall demanding such compensations.
Nevertheless, the timing and the volume of such payments
1517AGazRCLStNguMDCxDoj7ZQHvaZBWTJZj
suggest that these payments pertain to ransoms. Table IX
summarizes such payments.
Amount Time period Payments BTC USD value
$1,500 Mar. 12, ’14 - Dec. 12, ’15 222 678.7995 333,587.51
$1,750 Mar. 12, ’14 - Nov. 04, ’15 192 647.5063 336,578.87
$2,000 Mar. 06, ’14 - Jul. 06, ’14 170 650.7245 339,794.84
$10,000 Mar. 11, ’14 - Jul. 11, ’14 131 2623.3381 1,316,778.41
Total Mar. 06, ’14 - Dec. 12, ’15 715 4600.3684 2,326,739.63
Table IX: Summary of high value (possibly ransom)
payments to CryptoWall
If we add these payments to the original ransom payments,
then the revenue of CryptoWall reaches nearly 10,000 BTC,
i.e., approximately USD 4,500,000.
D. DMA Locker
Introduction: DMA Locker is one of the most actively
developed and updated ransomware so far. From encryption
algorithm to network communication, cybercrooks perpetually
updated each component of DMA Locker. Initially, it used
only the symmetric key cryptography for file encryption.
However, later versions employ a stronger encryption approach
by combining the AES-256 and the RSA-2048 encryption
algorithms. It affects Windows operating system.
Infection: The distribution mechanism of DMA Locker
also evolved with the course of time. The malicious payload
was hosted on compromised websites, and their links were
distributed via email spamming. It also infiltrated by hacking
Remote Desktops. The latest edition of the ransomware also
spread via Neutrino exploit kit [26].
Evolution: The development timeline of DMA Locker is
discussed below:
• DMA Locker 1.0: The first version of DMA Locker was
noticed in the last week of December 2015 with support
for two languages: Polish and English. It performs file
encryption by using the AES-256 algorithm in ECB
mode. It uses a single AES key to encrypt target files,
which is stored in the binary and deleted after use.
• DMA Locker 2.0: On February 3, 2016, DMA Locker
was updated to use separate keys for each file. After
encrypting a file, it encrypts the used AES key by RSA
public key and stores the encrypted AES key in the
encrypted file. The public key for RSA encryption comes
hardcoded in the binary.
• DMA Locker 3.0: Due to weak implementation of the
random number generator, the AES key generated by
the previous version can be guessed. In view to fix the
flaw, the third edition was released on February 22, 2016.
However, the entire campaign used the same RSA key-
pair. Meaning that single private key can be reused for
decrypting other infected systems.
• DMA Locker 4.0: The latest version of DMA Locker
was released on May 19, 2016. This version generates
a unique RSA key-pair on the server for each victim.
Unlike previous versions, DMA Locker 4.0 can not work
offline because it is designed to download the asymmetric
public key from the server [27].
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Ransom demand: The cybercrooks behind DMA Locker
accepted ransom payments through Bitcoin. DMA Locker 4.0
gives payment instructions on a website. The website was a
regularly (not Tor-based) hosted site. Surprisingly, the payment
site used the same IP address as the C&C. Similar to other
components, the ransom amount was also updated with time.
Moreover, the first two versions stipulate a strict deadline of
four days to pay the ransom. Other versions allow an extension
of three days at the cost of an increased ransom. The demanded
ransom and their corresponding timelines (both the dates are
included) are as follow:
• 1 BTC between December 28, 2015 and July 22, 2016.
• 1.3 BTC between January 19, 2016 and May 30, 2016.
• 2 BTC between January 28, 2016 and July 22, 2016 to
allowing a three-day ransom period.
• 4 BTC between February 22, 2016 and June 5, 2016 to
allowing a three-day ransom period.
• 8 BTC as late fee between February 22, 2016 and
August 5, 2016.
• 1.5 BTC as late fee between May 19, 2016 and
July 11, 2016.
• 3 BTC between May 24, 2016 and August 25, 2016.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: To under-
stand the economic impact of DMA Locker, we began with
eight Bitcoin addresses listed in Table A.4. Using these
addresses, Module1 generated 28 addresses belonging to DMA
Locker cluster (CDL). Our scrutiny of transactions (obtained
using Module2) to CDL shows that CDL received altogether
298 payments, i.e., more than 1,400 BTC (over USD 580,000).
Table X presents a summary of the total payments credited to
CDL .
Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
298 1,433.3463 593,498.26 580,763.95 567,543.86
Table X: Total payments credited to CDL including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: We used Module3,
guided by the timeline of ransom demands, to separate ransom
payments. Figure 17 depicts the total number of ransoms paid
by date. CDL received 5 payment on April 27, 2016, which
is the maximum number of ransoms paid in a single day. On
another side, as shown in Figure 18, CDL collected 12 BTC on
May 19, 2016, which corresponds to the maximum number of
Bitcoin received in a single day. Furthermore, CDL received
over USD 6,300 on August 5, 2016, which stands for the
maximum USD received in a single day, see Figure 19.
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Figure 17: Number of ransoms paid to CDL
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Figure 18: Number of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) by CDL
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Figure 19: USD value of ransoms paid to CDL
We further found that around 30% addresses in CDL col-
lected no more than one payment and nearly 20% Bitcoin
addresses received less than one Bitcoin. Furthermore, an
address16 collected 112.87 BTC in 38 ransom payments. These
values correspond to the maximum number of Bitcoin and the
maximum number of ransom collected by any address in CDL .
Table XI summarizes the ransoms paid to DMA Locker.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
1 BTC Dec. 28, ’15 - Jul. 22, ’16 16 14.7526 7,052.37
1.3 BTC Jan. 19, ’16 - May 30, ’16 4 5.2470 2,424.01
2 BTC Jan. 28, ’16 - Jul. 22, ’16 16 32.0809 16,638.46
4 BTC Feb. 22, ’16 - Jun. 05, ’16 33 131.9950 60,443.98
8 BTC (late) Feb. 22, ’16 - Aug. 05, ’16 4 32.4892 16,960.59
1.5 BTC (late) May 19, ’16 - Jul. 11, ’16 6 8.9147 5,136.87
3 BTC May 24, ’16 - Aug. 25, ’16 38 113.9797 69,506.49
Total Dec. 28, ’15 - Aug. 25, ’16 117 339.4591 178,162.77
Table XI: Summary of ransoms paid to DMA Locker
161LPgKoErPUeM92SDY5axJzYCdQbeiRHD6i
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We have identified 117 ransom payments to CDL , which
contribute to a total of 339.46 extorted BTC. Using day-to-day
average Bitcoin price, we estimate that these ransom payments
value USD 178,162.77.
E. Petya
Introduction: Initially seen in March 2016, this family of
malware denies access to the full system by targeting the
low-level structures on the disk. Petya spread via emails, and
was delivered as Windows executable with an icon of a PDF
document. Upon running, it opens a User Account Control
(UAC) window. Accepting UAC allows Petya to run. In this
case, it overwrites the Master Boot Record (MBR) with a
custom bootloader that loads a malicious kernel. Then, this
kernel encrypts the Master File Table (MFT) using Salsa20
stream cipher with a 32-byte long key, which leaves file system
unreadable. Figure 20 depicts the full process of Petya.
UAC 
prompt 
Infected exe
No infection
Reboot system, 
encrypt MFT
(Petya)
Accept
Reject
Figure 20: Workflow of Petya
Mischa: In May 2016, the malware was modified to inte-
grate another malicious payload known as Mischa. Mischa was
designed as a backup strategy to Petya. Altogether, they target
different (both high-level and low-level) layers of a system.
In this version, denying the UAC prompt directs Mischa to
encrypt local files on the victim computer; otherwise, Petya
proceeds. Figure 21 depicts the full process of Mischa. Both
Petya and Mischa can work offline without communicating
with their C&C. The payload from the dropper17 uses Crypt-
GenRandom function from the Windows CryptoAPI library to
generate a random encryption key. Mischa uses a CBC-style
file encryption utilizing a randomly generated key along with
the previously generated master key. Interestingly, Mischa can
encrypt documents as well as executables [28]. The cybercrim-
inals also offered RaaS through their own affiliate program.
GoldenEye: The malware was again rebranded as Golden-
Eye in early December 2016. In contrast with the previous
versions, GoldenEye executes both payloads, where possible.
Similar to its predecessors, it was also distributed via email.
But, the payload was attached to an MS Excel document. The
document prompts the user to enable Macro content. Enabling
Macro content executes a malicious Visual Basic Script, which
runs the Mischa payload to encrypt documents on the system.
After Mischa finishes, it attempts to gain system privileges via
17The file that launches a malware.
UAC 
prompt
Infected exe
Encrypt local 
files (Mischa)
Reboot system, 
encrypt MFT
(Petya)
Accept
Reject
Figure 21: Workflow of Mischa
DLL injection (Windows 7 - 8.1), or a UAC prompt is shown
(Windows 10). If DLL infection succeeds or the UAC prompt
is accepted, Petya payload encrypts the MFT. Figure 22 depicts
the full process of GoldenEye.
Enable 
Macro 
content
Infected document
No infection
Encrypt local files 
(Mischa)
Bypass 
UAC via 
DLL 
infection
Reboot system, 
encrypt MFT
(Petya)
Successful
NoUAC 
prompt
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Figure 22: Workflow of GoldenEye
NotPetya: The latest variant of Petya surfaced on
June 27, 2017. Kaspersky unofficially named18 it NotPetya/Ex-
Petr due to significant differences in its operations compared
to the earlier versions. Initially, NotPetya was distributed
as an update to MeDoc19 accounting software prevalent in
Ukraine. After infiltration, it self-propagates via two methods.
One of the methods is the EternalBlue exploit, which is an
exploit of Windows’ Server Message Block (SMB) protocol.
The same exploit is also used by WannaCry ransomware,
which was released only a month before NotPetya. It can
also spread across network shares by Windows Management
18www.kaspersky.com/blog/new-ransomware-epidemics/17314/
19www.medoc.ua/uk
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Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC), for which it uses
credentials acquired from the local machine. In contrast with
other ransomware, it focuses on the local network to spread
rather than the Internet. NotPetya works as a destructive data
wiper tool due to its inability to restore the encrypted sectors
of the physical disk [29].
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: We discuss
the financial transactions associated with only NotPetya be-
cause the payments received by the address clusters gener-
ated for Mischa and GoldenEye (using addresses listed in
Tables A.5 and A.6 respectively) were significantly less (no
more than USD 3) than the demanded ransoms (roughly
USD 1,000). For NotPetya, cybercriminals used a single
Bitcoin payment address to collect a fixed ransom of USD 300.
The address is listed in Table A.7. NotPetya cluster (CNP)
generated by Module1 also had only one Bitcoin addresses.
We acquired the detailed transaction history of this address
using Module2. CNP received exactly 70 payments. These
payments worth slightly above 4 BTC (over USD 10,000).
Table XII summarizes the payments credited in CNP .
Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
70 4.1787 10,717.74 10,284.42 9,958.33
Table XII: Total payments credited to CNP including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: We segre-
gated ransom payments using Module3. As shown in Fig-
ures 23, 24, and 25, on the day of its outbreak, i.e., on
June 27, 2017 CNP received somewhat above 3 BTC in
total 27 payments that amount approximately USD 8,000.It
collected the maximum number of ransom payments/Bit-
coin/USD on this day.
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Figure 23: Number of ransoms paid to CNP
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Figure 24: Number of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) by CNP
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Figure 25: USD value of ransoms paid to CNP
In total, we have identified 33 ransom payments to CNP ,
which add up to roughly 4.06 extorted BTC. Using day-to-day
average Bitcoin price, we calculate that these ransom payments
worth equivalent to USD 9,835.86. Table XIII summarizes the
ransoms paid to NotPetya.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
$300 Jun. 27, ’17 - Aug. 03, ’17 33 4.0576 9,835.86
Table XIII: Summary of ransoms paid to NotPetya
Given the irreversible destructive nature and the targeted-
software of NotPetya, many researchers suggested that the
primary aim of NotPetya was not money. Other researchers
speculated that it was probably a second level attack to wipe
traces of an early intrusion [30, 31].
F. KeRanger
Introduction: KeRanger emerged as the first fully functional
ransomware that targets macOS operating system. It was dis-
covered on March 4, 2016, by Palo Alto Networks. By nature
it is a trojan horse, it uploads infected system’s information
(e.g., model name, UUID) to its C&C over the Tor network
to obtain an RSA public key. Along with the key it also
receives victim-specific information that it is writes to a file
named “README FOR DECRYPT.txt.” KeRanger encrypts
each file F as follows:
1) Generate a random number (R).
2) Generate an Initialization Vector (I) using F’s content.
3) Encrypt R with the RSA key (obtained from C&C), and
store it at the beginning of F .encrypted file.
4) Store I inside the F .encrypted file.
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5) Mix R and I to generate an AES key.
6) Encrypt data of the original file with the AES key and
write the encrypted data to F .encrypted file [32].
Infection: KeRanger was disseminated via two infected
installers for the open source BitTorrent client project Trans-
mission version 2.90, which were available for download on
the official website. Moreover, these installers were signed
with a valid Mac app development certificate; hence, they
bypassed OS X’s Gatekeeper security feature.
Ransom demand: To decrypt the encrypted files, the cyber-
crooks asked the victims to pay exactly one Bitcoin (around
USD 400) through a website hosted on the Tor network.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: We be-
gan with six identified Bitcoin address of KeRanger. These
addresses are listed in Table A.8. Module1 identified ten
new addresses from these six addresses. Therefore, KeRanger
cluster (CKR) had a total of 16 addresses in our analysis. The
transactions (obtained using Module2) to CKR show that CKR,
in total, received only 13 payments. These transactions worth
around 10 BTC (nearly USD 4,200). Table XIV presents a
summary of the total payments credited to CKR
Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
13 10.0044 4,204.54 4,175.35 4,147.01
Table XIV: Total payments credited to CKR including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: We isolated
ransom payments using Module3. Figure 26 shows the total
number of ransoms paid to CKR. CKR received the last
ransom payment on March 17, 2016. Figures 27 and 28 depict
the total number of Bitcoin received (in ransom) and their
corresponding value in USD. Moreover, we found that none
of the address received more than one Bitcoin (more than one
ransom, in other words).
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Figure 26: Number of ransoms paid to CKR
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Figure 27: Number of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) by CKR
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Figure 28: USD value of ransoms paid to CKR
According to our analysis, CKR received only 10 ransom
payments, which contribute to roughly 9.99 extorted BTC.
Using day-to-day average Bitcoin price, we estimate that these
ransoms convert to USD 4,173.12. Table XV summarizes the
ransoms paid to KeRanger.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
1 BTC Mar. 04, ’16 - Mar. 17, ’16 10 9.9990 4,173.12
Table XV: Summary of ransoms paid to KeRanger
One of the possible reasons for such low number of ransom
payments could be that by March 5, 2016, Transmission
project removed the infected installers from the website, and
Apple revoked the abused certificate that allowed Gatekeeper
to block the infected installers.
G. WannaCry
Introduction: WannaCry (also known as WCry,
WanaCrypt0r, Wana Decrypt0r 2.0) is blended threat
with characteristics of both a worm and a ransomware. It was
first seen on May 12, 2017. It affects Windows system by
encrypting files using a combination of the RSA and the AES
algorithms. Interestingly, it encrypts each file with a separate
128-bit AES encryption key in CBC mode. Furthermore, it
encrypts each AES key individually using the RSA-2048
encryption algorithm [33].
Infection: WannaCry scans explicitly for the presence of
the DoublePulsar backdoor on a target. If the DoublePulsar
backdoor is not present, then it tries to compromise the system
using the EternalBlue exploit [34]. The EternalBlue exploit
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was exposed merely a few months before the WannaCry attack
by a hacker group known as The Shadow Brokers.
Kill switch and kill mutex: A kill switch is usually employed
to terminate a program’s execution. In case of WannaCry,
the kill switch was a domain name20. Upon initialization,
WannaCry tries to connect to the domain over HTTP. If the
connection is successful, then it stops and exits. Possibly,
it was designed to evade a sandbox testing. The kill switch
domain was hardcoded in the source code and was discovered
by Marcus Hutchins21. On another side, before beginning the
encryption process, WannaCry attempts to create a mutex
named “MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA” and exits if the
mutex is already present.
Ransom demand: The ransom note asks the victims to pay
USD 300 ransom in Bitcoin within three days. The ransom
note also states that the ransom amount would become double
(i.e., USD 600) after three days, and if the ransom is not paid
within seven days from the day of infection, all the encrypted
files would be deleted.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: Cybercrim-
inals intended to create a unique Bitcoin payment address for
each victim. But a race condition bug prevents the correct
execution of the code. In this situation, it presents one of
three hard-coded Bitcoin addresses to collect the ransom [35].
These addresses are listed in Table A.9. Moreover, using
these addresses, Module1 generated no new address. Hence,
WannaCry cluster (CWC) generated by our framework had
only three Bitcoin addresses during our analysis. We procured
the detailed transaction history of these three addresses us-
ing Module2. CWC received 341 payments. These payments
worth over 50 BTC (approximately USD 100,000). Table XVI
summarizes the payments credited in CWC .
Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
341 53.2906 102,141.19 99,549.05 96,497.20
Table XVI: Total payments credited to CWC including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
Economy of ransom payments in Bitcoin: Due to compara-
tively a smaller number of transactions, we manually verified
each payment to CWC . As shown in Table XVII, each Bitcoin
address collected at minimum 69 ransom payments and a
minimum of nearly 13.52 BTC.
Address Payments BTC
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw 77 15.1129
13AM4VW2dhxYgXeQepoHkHSQuy6NgaEb94 92 18.5431
115p7UMMngoj1pMvkpHijcRdfJNXj6LrLn 69 13.5183
Table XVII: Number of ransoms and Bitcoin received (in
ransoms) per address in CWC
Figures 29, 30, and 31 indicate that on May 15, 2017, CWC
received 70 payments that amount to nearly 14 BTC, which
is approximately USD 24,000. It is the day when it received
20www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
21en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MalwareTech
the maximum number of ransom payments/Bitcoin/USD in
a single day.
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Figure 29: Number of ransoms paid to CWC
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Figure 30: Number of Bitcoin received (in ransoms) by CWC
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Figure 31: USD value of ransoms paid to CWC
In total, we have identified 238 ransom payments to CWC ,
which add up to 47.17 extorted BTC. Using day-to-day
average Bitcoin price, we calculate that these ransom payments
worth equivalent to USD 86,076.76. Table XVIII summarizes
the ransoms payments made to WannaCry.
Ransom Time period Payments BTC USD value
$300
May 12, ’17 - Oct. 02, ’17
192 32.3430 58,416.62
$600 46 14.8313 27,660.14
Total 238 47.1743 86,076.76
Table XVIII: Summary of ransoms paid to WannaCry
The overall impact (including financial losses) due to Wan-
naCry infection could have been worse. But, thanks to the
early detection of the kill switch, which prevented the infected
computers from spreading WannaCry further.
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Other Bitcoin ransomware: We now briefly discuss all
those Bitcoin ransomware, for which the observed payments
either are entirely different (merely a few dollars) against the
demanded ransom or the date of transactions do not match
with the activity of the ransomware. Nevertheless, we make no
solid claims without further evidence. However, we make their
addresses and corresponding dataset available in Appendix A
and our repository (mentioned before) respectively for future
efforts in this direction of research.
H. CTB-Locker
Introduction: CTB-Locker (Curve-Tor-Bitcoin-Locker) first
appeared in mid-July 2014 as Critroni. Initially, it targeted
individual Windows users. But, soon its focus shifted to
vulnerable WordPress websites. The latter version encrypts the
homepage of a website and replaces the original homepage
with a new page containing the ransom note. It is also infa-
mous for using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the Tor
network to hide the C&C, Bitcoin for ransom payment, and its
availability in multiple (seven) languages. As a pioneer, it uses
ECC for encryption, which enables it to obtain the equivalent
level of security as the RSA with much smaller key sizes. E.g.,
a 256-bit ECC offers equivalent security as 3072-bit RSA. It
obtains a secret key by applying a SHA256 hash function to
a 52 bytes long random sequence, and Curve25519 generates
the corresponding public key. In fact, it uses a combination
of symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithm where the
AES algorithm encrypts the user’s files [36].
Infection: Researchers22 and allegedly participants23 dis-
closed that the attackers used an affiliate program to spread
the infection in return of profits. Generally, in an affiliate
program, the participants attempt to spread the infection via
several possible vectors. CTB-Locker was primarily distributed
through exploit kits (e.g., Rig and Nuclear) and malicious
email spam (e.g., overdue phone invoices, missed fax, bank
statements) campaigns that exploit Dalexis or Elenoocka
downloader component.
Ransom demand: In the beginning, the ransom was set at
0.5 BTC (about USD 300) for US, Europe, and Canada while
0.25 BTC for other countries. Later, the ransom was changed
to 0.4 BTC (about USD 150) that doubles after four days.
In addition, the victims could decrypt five files for free and
could also do test transaction of 0.0001 BTC on one of the
two dedicated Bitcoin addresses.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: The ad-
dresses belonging to CTB-Locker that we found are listed
in Table A.10. The last two addresses listed in the table are
those Bitcoin addresses where the victims could do a test
transaction. However, the cluster generated (using Module1)
from these addresses did not receive any payment except for
two test transactions. One of the possible reasons could be
the nature of the target audience. Most of the web hosting
plans facilitate periodic backups. If a web page becomes
inaccessible/encrypted, the webmaster can restore a relatively
fresh version without paying the ransom.
22malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/07/ctb-locker.html
23www.reddit.com/r/Malware/comments/2uffwc/ctb locker ama/
I. CryptoTorLocker2015
On February 5, 2015, Symantec discovered CryptoTor-
Locker2015 as a very low-level threat for Window operat-
ing system. It utilizes only public key cryptography for file
encryption. In particular, it uses the RSA-2048 encryption
algorithm, for which it downloads the RSA public key from an
attacker-controlled C&C. Being a trojan, it spread via classical
infection mechanisms such as drive-by download. It asks the
victims to pay 0.5 BTC (equivalent to USD/EUR 100) within
five days of infection to decrypt the files.
Module1 of our framework generated six new addresses
belonging to CryptoTorLocker2015 from the single address
listed in Table A.11. These seven addresses received almost
USD 1100 worth 5 BTC in 136 payments. But, only one
transaction24 that happened on February 11, 2015 satisfies the
criteria of the ransom demand specified by the attackers.
J. TeslaCrypt
Introduction: TeslaCrypt or AlphaCrypt began to spread in
mid February 2015. It searches explicitly for game-related user
content (e.g., custom maps and progress/save files) along with
other personal documents and pictures. TeslaCrypt ignores
audio files, video files, and removable (e.g., USB) storage. It
does not scan connected networks as well. It uses the AES
algorithm to encrypt files, but with an aim to mislead the
victims, it appends “ecc” extension to the encrypted files while
the ransom note message claims that it has used the RSA-
2048 encryption algorithm. Its C&C hid in the Tor anonymity
network and required an SSL encrypted connection from a
victim machine for communication. Preventing TeslaCrypt
from interacting with the C&C does not prevent the encryption
process because it generates the encryption keys locally.
Infection and ransom demand: TeslaCrypt was distributed
exclusively through Angler and Nuclear browser exploit
kits [37]. The attackers accepted the ransoms via various
payment methods. The ransom amount in Bitcoin was 1.5 BTC
within seven days, 2.5 BTC otherwise. The victims from North
American region could also choose to pay USD 1000 with
PayPal My Cash cards while the European victims could pay
EUR 600 with Ukash or paysafecard.
Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: The pay-
ments collected by the address cluster (generated from the
addresses listed in Table A.12) do not match with the ransom
amount demanded by the attackers. However, FireEye research
team in their study [38] describes that the attackers negotiated
with the victims and gave “discounts” on the ransom amount.
In this case, the attackers accumulated around 254.6 BTC,
which converts to about USD 57,272. Later, the attackers
publicly released25 the master decryption key.
K. Chimera
In the November 2015, cybercrooks began to target English-
and German-speaking Windows users with Chimera ran-
somware. The cybercrooks distributed Chimera via targeted
24blockchain.info/tx/36f2bbc56e7ce7bea59265ce1b7f9ac42040dc5491f01a
4b338f619293515820
25www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/teslacrypt-shuts-down-and-
releases-master-decryption-key/
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e-mails to small businesses and companies. Unlike other
ransomware, it does not use a Tor website to handle payment
instructions or to hide the C&C. Instead, it is the first ran-
somware that uses Bitmessage26 P2P protocol to interact with
the C&C and to obtain the RSA public/private keys. In such
scenario, it is difficult, if not impossible, to take down all peers
in the network that are assisting ransomware’s operations.
It is also the first ransomware to use doxing as a pressure
tactic. It threatens the victims to post personal data including
pictures and videos on the internet if the ransom is not paid.
However, several ransomware analysts showed that it was a
bogus threat [39]. Chimera asks the victims to pay between
0.9 BTC to 2.5 BTC as ransom. The addresses belonging to
Chimera that we found are listed in Table A.13. The payments
received by the cluster generated (using Module1) from these
addresses do not fall in the range of the ransom asked by
the cybercrooks. Dramatically, rival ransomware developers
leaked the RSA private keys of Chimera27.
L. Hi Buddy!
Hi Buddy! was active in the first quarter of 2016. Like many
other ransomware, it encrypts only user’s files and leaves the
system files responsible for running Windows operating sys-
tem. Upon execution, it attempts to connect with its C&C over
Tor2Web service and sends information such as the version of
operating system, location (country) of the victim machine.
The response from the C&C includes a string variable whose
value (“FIRST” or “RECEIVED”) depends on whether it
should encrypt or decrypt the files. The values “FIRST”
and “RECEIVED” correspond to encryption and decryption
respectively. It is important to note that the encryption/de-
cryption process does not execute until it receives the response
from the C&C. It uses the AES-256 algorithm to encrypt user’s
files. The encryption key is generated by hashing (SHA-256)
a string variable named “password,” which is obtained from
the C&C. It spread via general spamming techniques. After
encryption, it shows a ransom note asking about 0.8 BTC for
decryption. The address cluster generated from the address
listed in Table A.14 did not receive any ransom.
M. Jigsaw
Jigsaw was released in late March 2016 to affect systems
running Windows operating system. It is considered to be the
most dramatic ransomware so far. It was released in several
different languages, while each variant was hard-coded to exe-
cute only after a specific date. As a representative example, the
English version was set to execute after March 23, 2016 while
the Portuguese version was written to run after April 6, 2016.
Moreover, It employs an unprecedented extortion strategy.
During the first 24 hours it deletes a few files every hour;
after 24 hours, hundreds of files every hour; and after 48 hours,
thousands of files every hour. And, if the ransom is not paid
within 72 hours, it deletes all the remaining files. If the victim
shuts-down or restarts the computer, it destroys 1000 files as
26bitmessage.org/wiki/Main Page
27twitter.com/JanusSecretary/status/757951375561072640
“punishment.” Furthermore, each variant demands a distinct
amount of ransom ranging from USD 23 to USD 5000 to be
paid through Bitcoin.
The cybercriminals hosted the payload on free cloud stor-
age services such as 1fichier.com and distributed the links
to the malicious payload through email spamming. Jigsaw
works offline and uses the AES-128 encryption algorithm
in CBC mode to encrypt user’s files. Using 19 addresses
(listed in Table A.15), our framework generated 24 addresses
belonging to Jigsaw ransomware. Altogether these addresses
collected approximately 2.5 BTC (USD 1,200) in 58 payments.
However, all these payments occurred from March 2016 to
August 2016, i.e., during the period when Jigsaw was active.
Hence, we may argue that perhaps all these transactions were
ransom payments.
N. ZCryptor
A security researcher called Jack first reported28 ZCryptor
on May 24, 2016. It targets computers running Windows op-
erating system. After obtaining victim-specific encryption key
from its C&C, it uses the RSA encryption algorithm to encrypt
user’s files. ZCryptor exhibits worm-like behavior. It is one of
the few ransomware that can self-propagate to other connected
computers and network devices even without using an exploit
kit or spamming. For initial infection, the cybercrooks used
conventional distribution techniques such as email spamming,
fake software (e.g., Adobe Flash) updater, and macro malware
in Microsoft Office suite. It also attempts to distract the
victim by showing benign pop-ups while performing the file
encryption. Once the encryption process completes, ZCryptor
displays its ransom message in which it asks for 1.2 BTC
(about USD 500) to be paid within four days. Nevertheless,
it permits additional three days for the payment at the cost of
5 BTC (about USD 2,100). The address cluster generated from
the address listed in Table A.16 did not receive any ransom.
It is noteworthy that on May 26, 2016, i.e., within two days
of its discovery, Microsoft issued an alert29 to its users about
ZCryptor and also updated the definition base of Windows
Defender to protect against ZCryptor.
O. VenusLocker
Introduction, infection, and ransom demand: At the be-
ginning of August 2016, VenusLocker, a new eda2-based
ransomware began to target Windows based systems. Similar
to most ransomware, VenusLocker encrypts data files using the
AES-256 algorithm. It generates the AES encryption key on
the victim’s system from a cryptographically-strong random
number generator and encrypts it with an embedded RSA-
2048 public key before sending to the C&C. It also creates
and conveys a unique ID to C&C to identify the infected
system. It spread primarily via drive-by download. It allows
only three days (with no extension) to pay the ransom in
Bitcoin. At first, it demanded USD 100 as ransom. But, soon
it asked USD 500. However, the ransom amount settled on
one BTC with an update in December 2016.
28malwarefor.me/zcrypt-ransomware/
29blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/05/26/link-lnk-to-ransom/
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Associated Bitcoin addresses and transactions: Initially, we
identified three addresses belonging to VenusLocker. These
addresses are listed in Table A.17. Module1 of our framework
identified three new addresses from the addresses. Therefore,
VenusLocker cluster (CVL) had a total of six addresses in
our analysis. The transactions (obtained using Module2) to
CVL reveal that CVL , in total, received 11 payments. The
total worth of these transactions is almost 7 BTC (more than
USD 6,500). Table XIX presents a summary of the total
payments credited to CVL .
Payments BTC
USD value
(daily highest
BTC price)
USD value
(daily average
BTC price)
USD value
(daily lowest
BTC price)
11 6.8155 6,861.73 6,753.81 6,637.06
Table XIX: Total payments credited to CVL including all
ransom and non-ransom payments
The campaign was launched again as The Trump Locker
in February 2017 and rebranded in March 2017 as
The LLTP Locker. The ransom amount in The Trump Locker
varied from USD 50 to USD 150 (in Bitcoin), while
The LLTP Locker targeted specifically Spanish users asking
USD 200 (in Bitcoin) as ransom. The address clusters gener-
ated for The Trump Locker and The LLTP Locker (using the
addresses listed in Tables A.18 and A.19 respectively) never
received any payment.
P. KillDisk
KillDisk debuted as a data wiper malware. It affected energy
industry, finance sector, sea transport, and news agencies in
2015 and 2016. In early December 2016, the malware was
updated to integrate a ransomware component. The KillDisk
ransomware targets not only Windows operating system but
also Linux workstations and servers, which magnifies its
damage potential. It targets every drive (local and network)
that the victim can access. Both the Windows and Linux
variant work differently.
The Windows variant, detected by CyberX [40], encrypts
each file with a separate AES-256 encryption key (generated
using CryptGenRandom function from the Windows Cryp-
toAPI library). After use, it encrypts the AES keys using a
public RSA-1028 key. It obtains the RSA public key via the
Telegram API from the C&C. It uses the whitelisting technique
to avoid sandbox analysis.
The Linux variant, detected by ESET [41], performs encryp-
tion using Triple-DES applied to 4096-byte blocks where each
file is encrypted using a different set of 64-bit encryption keys
generated locally. However, the encryption keys are neither
stored locally nor sent to the C&C, which means that the
decryption is virtually impossible. Furthermore, it also makes
the machine unbootable as it rewrites the boot sector and uses
the GRUB bootloader to show the ransom note.
Both the variants show the same ransom note, asking an
enormous ransom of 222 BTC to be paid on the same Bitcoin
address. The address is listed in Table A.20. The address
cluster generated by our framework also had only one Bitcoin
address, which did not receive any ransom.
Q. FindZip
FindZip ransomware, also known as Filecoder, was dis-
covered and reported by ESET researchers [42] on Febru-
ary 22, 2017. It is written in Swift programming language
to infect systems with macOS operating system. It encrypts
all mounted external and network storage. Upon execution, it
locally generates a 25-characters long random string, which it
uses to create a separate encrypted .zip file for each user file
using the “zip” shell command. Next, it deletes all the original
files by the “rm” command and sets the encrypted file’s time
to February 13, 2010 using the “touch” command. It was
distributed as a “Patcher” application from torrent distribution
sites. The torrent file downloads a single ZIP archive file
that contains fake patching applications for premium software
such as Adobe Premiere Pro and Microsoft Office for Mac.
However, the applications are not signed with an Apple-
recognized key.
The ransom message is hardcoded inside the ransomware.
Hence, it uses the same Bitcoin address for each victim.
It demands 0.25 BTC for decrypting the files and instructs
the victims to wait for 24 hours after paying the ransom.
But it promises to start the decryption in 10 minutes if the
victim pays 0.45 BTC. The address cluster generated from the
addresses listed in Table A.21 did not collect any payment.
R. ThunderCrypt
ThunderCrypt emerged in the first week of May 2017.
It targeted primarily Taiwanese Windows users for ransom
extortion. It carefully encrypts the user’s data by a hybrid
RSA-2048 public key encryption algorithm. It does not encrypt
the essential files of the operating system so that the system
keeps on working and has an active internet connection.
To distribute the ransomware, the cybercriminals injected a
malicious script into a Taiwanese forum “ENVY.” The script
triggers a pop-up, which requests permission to run a fake
Adobe Flash Player installer. The bogus installer was designed
to drop the ThunderCrypt payload on the victim machine.
ThunderCrypt demands exactly 0.345 Bitcoin (roughly
USD 500) from the victims. And like most ransomware, it
threatens the victim to erase the key from the server if the
ransom is not paid. Additionally, it allows the victim to decrypt
one file to prove that the decryption is possible. The addresses
belonging to ThunderCrypt that we found are listed in Ta-
ble A.22. However, the cluster generated from these addresses
did not receive any payment. It is also worth mentioning that in
communication30 with a victim, cybercriminals admitted that
their campaign failed.
S. DoubleLocker
On October 13, 2017, ESET researchers [43] reported the
first-ever ransomware that targets Android operating system.
DoubleLocker is rewritten from an Android banking Trojan
named “Android.BankBot.211.origin.” It abuses Android’s ac-
cessibility services to elevate privileges on the victim system.
Unlike its banking parent, it does not steal victims’ banking
30wccftech.com/thundercrypt-ransomware-taiwanese-man/
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credentials. It rather changes the device’s PIN code and en-
crypts device’s primary storage using the AES-256 encryption
algorithm, which leaves the device inaccessible to the user.
Similar to its banking parent, the attackers distributed it as a
fake Adobe Flash Player app over compromised websites. To
release the decryption key, DoubleLocker asks the victims to
pay 0.0130 BTC (about USD 50) within 24 hours and waits
for three confirmations of the payment. The address cluster
(generated from the addresses listed in Table A.23) received
only one payment, which is far too less than the asked ransom.
T. Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit started to spread from October 24, 2017. Similar
to NotPetya, it encrypts files as well as the MFT on the
Windows machine, and it also replaces the MBR with a
custom bootloader. For file encryption, it uses the AES-128
encryption algorithm in CBC mode, and the RSA-2048 en-
cryption secures the keys. It uses DiskCryptor driver in AES-
XTS mode to encrypt disk partitions on the infected system.
Nevertheless, it is not a wiper like NotPetya. The attackers
distributed it via drive-by attack as a dropper-file named
“install flash player.exe,” which prompts a standard UAC to
elevate administrative privileges. Additionally, it exploits the
EternalBlue exploit to infect machines in the local network.
The ransom note asks the victims to use a Tor website to
make a payment of 0.05 BTC within 42 hours, after which
the price of decryption goes up [44]. The payments collected
by the address cluster (generated from the addresses listed in
Table A.24) are significantly lesser than the asked ransom.
VI. LIMITATIONS
One of the most important and decisive elements for the
quality of the outcomes of our framework is the address
identification module, presented in Section IV-A. It relies on
the Bitcoin addresses collected from the public sources; the
quality of data collected from the public sources could be
a concern. One of the promising alternatives is to collect
binaries of the ransomware and execute them several times
in a virtual environment to witness/obtain Bitcoin addresses.
However, the question of integrity and authenticity of the
binaries remains the same. Given the nature of the problem,
we followed the approach used in the previous studies [15, 17]
and took extreme precaution while collecting addresses from
the public sources.
The fundamental principles of the Bitcoin protocol implic-
itly impart two types of flaws in our address identification
module: overestimation and underestimation. Our method-
ology would overestimate when multiple users pool their
transactions into a single transaction; as in the case of mixers.
On another side, it would underestimate when there exists
no evidence (in the blockchain) of an address owned by a
user being used in conjunction with any other address of the
same user. However, in a given scenario, it would report more
accurate results as compared to the existing approaches due to
its attributes of ransom classifications.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Pseudo-anonymity and irreversibility of Bitcoin transaction
protocol have made Bitcoin a dexterous utility among cy-
bercriminals. Unlike genuine users, who seek to transact se-
curely and efficiently; cybercrooks exploit these characteristics
to commit immutable and presumably untraceable monetary
fraud. In this paper, we have presented our comprehensive
and longitudinal study on twenty recent Bitcoin ransomware
along with their renamed/rebranded versions. We have also
introduced our framework to identify, collect, and analyze
Bitcoin addresses that belong to the cybercriminals behind
the ransomware. Moreover, we elaborated the characteristics
and the functionality of the ransomware as well as reported
the economic impact of such ransomware from the Bitcoin
payment perspective.
In the future, we will extend our identification frame-
work to other cryptography-based currencies. We will also
investigate the ransoms extorted via other payment options;
we hope to present a comprehensive report that will include
ransom payments from all payment option endorsed by the
ransomware. Finally, we will attempt to trace how the received
ransoms were used and by whom.
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APPENDIX
A. Ransomware’ Bitcoin addresses identified in our initial
investigation
# Address Source(s)
1 135N2nfAkextd6E25quXpM98qLSi2BccCb [45]2 1AEoiHY23fbBn8QiJ5y6oAjrhRY1Fb85uc
3 18iEz617DoDp8CNQUyyrjCcC7XCGDf5SVb [45, 46]4 1KP72fBmh3XBRfuJDMn53APaqM6iMRspCh
Table A.1: CryptoLocker
# Address Source(s)
1 19DyWHtgLgDKgEeoKjfpCJJ9WU8SQ3gr27 [47]2 1EmLLj8peW292zR2VvumYPPa9wLcK4CPK1
Table A.2: CryptoDefense
20
# Address Source(s)
1 1PoebUjR5pdH88tc9ECQ1PCLaCrtPnG9fm [48]
2 128pJdREzcR6xorYPQAPzGf8RwMQjRBzDt [49]
3 15WUYqKerTtxi4rUEmnakw5gRMkr3nZCQd [50]
4 1L66AcnbuZkYjs8eE6uVbTUxmorHYGKxFJ [51]
5 16REtGSobiQZoprFnXZBR2mSWvRyUSJ3ag [52]
6 16Z6sidfLrfNoxJNu4qM5zhRttJEUD3XoB [53]
7 12LE1yNak3ZuNTLa95KYR2CQSKb6rZnELb [54]
8 1JYYzNHDaGC7noiE4eKatuYA4AThqVocDd [55]
9 1BhLzCZGY6dwQYgX4B6NR5sjDebBPNapvv [25, 56]
10 16yd1Wj2NZa2uLZ6W4UDCDJ2Ttw92uFaT7 [25, 57]
11 1LGnuv6KX9SXB8eM72dnBAcECeaC8Z2zje [25, 58]
12 1L7SLmazbbcy614zsDSLwz4bxz1nnJvDeV
[25, 59]13 19yqWit95eFGmUTYDLr3memcDoJiYgUppc14 16N3jvnF7UhRh74TMmtwxpLX6zPQKPbEbh
15 1ApF4XayPo7Mtpe326o3xMnSgrkZo7TCWD
And, 27 other distinct addresses that are listed on [25]
Table A.3: CryptoWall
# Address Source(s)
1 1MrKJhiECV3RufrY1dSybSXRCwSw11Co6i [60]
2 1C8yA7wJuKD4D2giTEpUNcdd7UNExEJ45r [61]
3 166vHLnGB1pCQGxdBkRiMkHW5WGQDbsw6s [62]
4 1BA48s9Eeh77vwWiEgh5Vt29G3YJN1PRoR [63]
5 18mfoGHSfe9h145e8djHK5rChDTnGfPDU9 [64]
6 16hHkyuzCDRFzoejVuqajqrnbmKHSmEfQM [65]
7 1382JAg5xbQv7QNwq1svDeyw6ELtNCmujG [66]8 1KXw7aJR4THWAxtnxZYzmysdLXVhLfa97n
Table A.4: DMA Locker
# Address Source(s)
1 13dN96pRTQDhpWRqKyLTbgRxeTN52p2CqY [67]
Table A.5: Mischa
# Address Source(s)
1 1BAdEKq6zE1JDL8g2pA1MDRHbW1wvYCWhT [68]
2 1MGnopAa6MAGjUpCEmRiSAcVKZNB6n8gnR [69]
3 17xV74Hp2zNR74yG3AJvPpNMchPJHm2iUo [70]
Table A.6: GoldenEye
# Address Source(s)
1 1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWX [29, 71]
Table A.7: NotPetya
# Address Source(s)
1 1PGAUBqHNcwSHYKnpHgzCrPkyxNxvsmEof [72]
2 1Lhgda4K77rFMTkgBKqmsdinDNYYVbLDJN [73]
3 1KGusS7xB9hnqZQdCZ1G8Tno16RfTS95ey [74]
4 1KPPqHpd8Z9S6pQH1qVovzyejyfDMghp4u [75]
5 1J9PMCpbrnicZoBUdyuNBwi4QvXwq6Korq [76]
6 16hhyeg7WMh4Go7JqNKRwmD95bRd4aenwz [77]
Table A.8: KeRanger
# Address Source(s)
1 13AM4VW2dhxYgXeQepoHkHSQuy6NgaEb94
[33, 78]2 12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw
3 115p7UMMngoj1pMvkpHijcRdfJNXj6LrLn
Table A.9: WannaCry
# Address Source(s)
1 1EfuwPcYeCTes24X8CVGMUCR1H4yZ4CyoE [79]
2 1EhJcMYwQKKWQcLFBjjYaMGTVncpQMJbbv [80]
3 1Bj2z4j3weU1g9jwu4oHQQA6x8x2G2FRRm [81]
4 1MScgv8kvbVLwGbciuw44gvy23rocaNCc8 [82]
5 1JXMiCkbrPiDWxoZ8oJ9yQZutHoaGQtXCF
[83]6 12UrsknT8hqYGpi8NToS2GWCWaLKtR2UXn7 1PAVxqYtWD1RBAjE5voSDnUSefGGUvCwpm
8 1N3qTaZsUqU2owUVjmijVyHB4uiid2JoXd
9 1PWLk2FP6r3FzKcqq9UgsYVZ9Ev6gufCsJ
[84]10 1BLeMsrSLB8H1fDDLRhQbLHScoC58ncf4x11 1A6GJMhpPhCcM557o62scEtuVXNAFe74fa
12 1BGDTqDZyD446Q71eGhdmWLzyCHVPZUJxv
Table A.10: CTB-Locker
# Address Source(s)
1 1KpP1YGGxPHKTLgET82JBngcsBuifp3noW [85]
Table A.11: CryptoTorLocker2015
# Address Source(s)
1 1NRn15kJnVRrptTSQJJnMD9KJcWkVFh1Gv [37]
2 15Y2TmHrxjmRFxfNUttwb9aU4DifvDpWKM [86]
3 1JthvnK8aoieXpx8YCAEtQwhfZSjSkdNox [87]
4 1L2jriaKw39jZysdH7nhe6eMSLSPNHvvHx [88]
5 1GQf1kEFK3SmVw8AMjRcn7jX1mvrGSDTkK [89]
Table A.12: TeslaCrypt
# Address Source(s)
1 1HqoNfpAJFMy9E36DBSk1ktPQ9o9fn2RxX [90]
2 15QzHEbNZWp2w1i2mfZSx7pV5YNM4ahszB [91]
3 1GaVKrVT17DN4dnWbTqGB9qG3rQrk1JBe9 [92]
4 1MZsTFUNMGxQxz38wWm8CtBoycW7VD5z7v [93]
5 1DGqEKZJdCd4YftWPuK5Z1HFBdeyz9RNDU [94]
Table A.13: Chimera
# Address Source(s)
1 1AoNMLZfhw7cbMCKAhaKHiveMdwFyVUGeA [95]
Table A.14: Hi Buddy!
# Address Source(s)
1 15fbyNgDnqYQR5vSHJ8PTAEJbKy4dwNBCZ [96]
2 12YHmaLEAbWx3o3p6BvegG9WH47EYs8t1V [97]
3 15MHczWfcYxf3P3NwYqCthaNiieGP8RY9d [98]
4 3NQoq5MVPfEMw12gB4a2c1G61mRZyMymsB [99]
5 12vfQqmMxiDvZdzYHndfURupmcjjs8uSpY [100]
6 1FLjcTFpz9MhwLdZ4xm9onpAnUGfRbGdXg [101]
7 1Cj37Tw5uHwfye6Srd1zHzSMhUekp3jM63 [102]
8 1Q5B5udzDLpNJbpedGpyGMLVU5DR5dTqx6 [103]
9 13VEVaJUMdJyQ7ttPfBaVNKjj2dS9ahU1z [104]
10 1HxkJ3vz2tvpcHgdt9yyY4XivdY9jKkcZH
[105]11 1LBhCecBmT23hybSUYyFW1YYqtTJcvFui2
12 1H8BXLJsLk9YCoNeBahYbgWo5ZqEn752ey
13 1L9GdBW65Rt6e8UY69bnWNWomsppFFFR2X
[106]
14 1ESe1nekuFJcEWycb1JjCz9KneNEm8yjg3
15 1EVNFaX7HktW1ud6fPueoMJ2Xw4UfYGY5Y
16 1CcAYfsKNNFPq7AKkbKQzRKw2kqjrqUeN9
17 18jCCAR2QZf6uZTnu4769ZknPfXjbmh1mw
18 1EH3yoQciVcWUufa4NWJvftyvvFxjbFLtQ
19 1F5RJzWN1g38wD9XbcspcxaYDU5hKpdvm8
Table A.15: Jigsaw
21
# Address Source(s)
1 17XajwHHeWbfKfNwn57sHRMAEXxvQUUGNd [107, 108]
Table A.16: ZCryptor
# Address Source(s)
1 16jvWspVfvhjRgJhGCDETf29cjQAyNmx9G [109]
2 1JKVwmeokitMHAFxCUeC4yrd8pdWxDAjZW [110]
3 1Dj9YnMiciNgaKuyzKynygu7nB21tvV6QD [111, 112]
Table A.17: VenusLocker
# Address Source(s)
1 1N82pq3XovKoJYqUmTrRiXftpNHZyu4jyv [113]
Table A.18: The Trump Locker
# Address Source(s)
1 19fhNi9L2aYXTaTFWueRhJYGsGDaN6WGcP [114]
Table A.19: The LLTP Locker
# Address Source(s)
1 1Q94RXqr5WzyNh9Jn3YLDGeBoJhxJBigcF [41]
Table A.20: KillDisk
# Address Source(s)
1 1EZrvz1kL7SqfemkH3P1VMtomYZbfhznkb [42]
Table A.21: FindZip
# Address Source(s)
1 18yfx86BwNK5xYKw71uaHwAxPgCGRJaqgg [115]
2 1HFY12o56xbHer3oeNxC99A7SGyXaR64hs [116]
3 18KfMJBTDWUUa1h4tm58swbkvsgHNZ6d2g [117]
Table A.22: ThunderCrypt
# Address Source(s)
1 1CvcvetHZ81V8itkDtF8iRpLfPp7Zz8UER [43]
2 1HxKouDDK9WbkizMEnf23tftHSefWhUyXR [118]
Table A.23: DoubleLocker
# Address Source(s)
1 1GxXGMoz7HAVwRDZd7ezkKipY4DHLUqzmM [119]2 17GhezAiRhgB8DGArZXBkrZBFTGCC9SQ2Z
Table A.24: Bad Rabbit
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System,” Available: bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, 2008.
[2] Symantec Inc. (2017) “Internet Security Threat
Report”. Available: www.symantec.com/security
response/publications/threatreport.jsp.
[3] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor:
The Second-generation Onion Router,” in USENIX Se-
curity Symposium, 2004, pp. 1–17.
[4] J. D. Tygar and B. Yee, “Cryptography: It’s Not Just for
Electronic Mail Anymore,” Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, Tech. Rep., 1993.
[5] G. Medvinsky and C. Neuman, “NetCash: A Design
for Practical Electronic Currency on the Internet,” in
1st ACM CCS, 1993, pp. 102–106.
[6] S. Bistarelli and F. Santini, “Go with the -Bitcoin- Flow,
with Visual Analytics,” in 12th ACM ARES, 2017, pp.
1–6.
[7] D. McGinn, D. Birch, D. Akroyd, M. Molina-Solana,
Y. Guo, and W. J. Knottenbelt, “Visualizing Dynamic
Bitcoin Transaction Patterns,” Big Data, vol. 4, no. 2,
pp. 109–119, 2016.
[8] G. Di Battista, V. Di Donato, M. Patrignani, M. Pizzo-
nia, V. Roselli, and R. Tamassia, “BitConeView: Visu-
alization of Flows in the Bitcoin Transaction Graph,” in
12th IEEE VizSec, 2015, pp. 1–8.
[9] F. Reid and M. Harrigan, “An Analysis of Anonymity
in the Bitcoin System,” in 3rd IEEE PASSAT, 2011, pp.
1318–1326.
[10] N. Christin, “Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement
Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online Marketplace,”
in 22nd ACM WWW, 2013, pp. 213–224.
[11] D. Ron and A. Shamir, “How Did Dread Pirate Roberts
Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth?” in Springer
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, LNCS, vol.
8438, 2014, pp. 3–15.
[12] K. Soska and N. Christin, “Measuring the Longitudi-
nal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace
Ecosystem,” in USENIX Security Symposium, 2015, pp.
33–48.
[13] S. Meiklejohn, M. Pomarole, G. Jordan, K. Levchenko,
D. McCoy, G. M. Voelker, and S. Savage, “A Fistful
of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with
No Names,” in 13th ACM IMC, 2013, pp. 127–140.
[14] D. Y. Huang, D. McCoy, M. M. Aliapoulios, V. G. Li,
L. Invernizzi, E. Bursztein, K. McRoberts, J. Levin,
K. Levchenko, and A. C. Snoeren, “Tracking Ran-
somware End-to-end,” in 39th IEEE S&P, 2018, pp.
1–14.
[15] K. Liao, Z. Zhao, A. Doupe´, and G.-J. Ahn, “Behind
Closed Doors: Measurement and Analysis of Cryp-
toLocker Ransoms in Bitcoin,” in APWG eCrime Re-
search, 2016, pp. 1–13.
[16] A. Kharraz, W. Robertson, D. Balzarotti, L. Bilge, and
E. Kirda, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: A Look Under
the Hood of Ransomware Attacks,” in 12th Springer
DIMVA, 2015, pp. 3–24.
[17] M. Spagnuolo, F. Maggi, and S. Zanero, “BitIodine:
Extracting Intelligence from the Bitcoin Network,” in
Springer Financial Cryptography and Data Security,
LNCS, vol. 8437, 2014, pp. 457–468.
[18] K. Jarvis. (2013) “CryptoLocker Ransomware”.
Available: www.secureworks.com/research/
cryptolocker-ransomware.
[19] joostbijl. (2014) “CryptoLocker ransomware intelli-
gence report”. Available: blog.fox-it.com/2014/08/06/
cryptolocker-ransomware-intelligence-report/.
[20] D. Ron and A. Shamir, “Quantitative Analysis of the
Full Bitcoin Transaction Graph,” in Springer Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, LNCS, vol. 7859,
22
2013, pp. 6–24.
[21] A. Biryukov, D. Khovratovich, and I. Pustogarov,
“Deanonymisation of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network,”
in 21st ACM CCS, 2014, pp. 15–29.
[22] M. Conti, S. Kumar, C. Lal, and S. Ruj, “A Survey on
Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin,” IEEE Commu-
nications Surveys & Tutorials, 2018.
[23] B. Stone-Gross. (2012) “The Lifecycle of Peer to Peer
(Gameover) ZeuS”. Available: www.secureworks.com/
research/the lifecycle of peer to peer gameover
zeus.
[24] Emsisoft Lab. (2014) “CryptoDefense: The story
of insecure ransomware keys and self-serving
bloggers”. Available: blog.emsisoft.com/2014/04/
04/cryptodefense-the-story-of-insecure-ransomware-
keys-and-self-serving-bloggers/.
[25] Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat In-
telligence. (2014) “CryptoWall Ransomware Threat
Analysis”. Available: www.secureworks.com/research/
cryptowall-ransomware.
[26] Broadanalysis Threat Intelligence and Mal-
ware Research. (2016) “Neutrino EK from
104.238.185.187 sends DMA Locker 4.0”.
Available: www.broadanalysis.com/2016/05/22/
neutrino-from-104-238-185-187-sends-dma-locker-4-
0/.
[27] Malwarebytes Labs. (2016) “DMA Locker 4.0:
Known ransomware preparing for a massive
distribution”. Available: blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-
analysis/2016/05/dma-locker-4-0-known-ransomware-
preparing-for-a-massive-distribution/.
[28] Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2016) “Inside Petya
and Mischa ransomware”. Available: blog.avast.com/
inside-petya-and-mischa-ransomware.
[29] Symantec Security Response Team. (2017) “Petya
ransomware outbreak: Here’s what you need to
know”. Available: www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-
intelligence/petya-ransomware-wiper.
[30] SecureWorks. (2017) “In the Aftermath of the ‘Not-
Petya’ Attack”. Available: www.secureworks.com/blog/
in-the-aftermath-of-the-notpetya-attack.
[31] LogRhythm Labs. (2017) “NotPetya Technical
Analysis”. Available: logrhythm.com/pdfs/threat-
intelligence-reports/notpetya-technical-analysis-threat-
intelligence-report.pdf.
[32] C. Xiao and J. Chen. (2016) “New
OS X Ransomware KeRanger Infected
Transmission BitTorrent Client Installer”.
Available: researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/
2016/03/new-os-x-ransomware-keranger-infected-
transmission-bittorrent-client-installer/.
[33] Counter Threat Unit Research Team.
(2017) “WCry Ransomware Analysis”.
Available: www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-
ransomware-analysis.
[34] M. Lee, W. Mercer, P. Rascagneres, and C. Williams.
(2017) “Player 3 Has Entered the Game: Say Hello
to ‘WannaCry”’. Available: blog.talosintelligence.com/
2017/05/wannacry.html.
[35] Symantec Security Response Team. (2017) “What
you need to know about the WannaCry Ran-
somware”. Available: www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-
intelligence/wannacry-ransomware-attack.
[36] zairon. (2015) “CTB-Locker encryption/decryption
scheme in details”. Available: zairon.wordpress.com/
2015/02/17/ctb-locker-encryptiondecryption-scheme-
in-details/.
[37] Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat
Intelligence. (2015) “TeslaCrypt Ransomware”.
Available: www.secureworks.com/research/teslacrypt-
ransomware-threat-analysis.
[38] Nart Villeneuve. (2015) “TeslaCrypt: Following the
Money Trail and Learning the Human Costs of
Ransomware”. Available: www.fireeye.com/blog/
threat-research/2015/05/teslacrypt followin.html.
[39] Malwarebytes Labs. (2015) “Inside Chimera
Ransomware - the first ‘doxingware’ in wild”.
Available: blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/
2015/12/inside-chimera-ransomware-the-first-
doxingware-in-wild/.
[40] P. Neray. (2016) “New Killdisk Malware
Brings Ransomware Into Industrial Domain”.
Available: cyberx-labs.com/en/blog/new-killdisk-
malware-brings-ransomware-into-industrial-domain/.
[41] R. Lipovsky and P. Ka´lnai. (2017) “KillDisk now
targeting Linux: Demands $250K ransom, but can’t
decrypt”. Available: www.welivesecurity.com/2017/
01/05/killdisk-now-targeting-linux-demands-250k-
ransom-cant-decrypt/.
[42] M. Le´veille´. (2017) “New crypto-ransomware hits ma-
cOS”. Available: www.welivesecurity.com/2017/02/22/
new-crypto-ransomware-hits-macos/.
[43] Eset Research. (2017) “DoubleLocker:
Innovative Android Ransomware”.
Available: www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/13/
doublelocker-innovative-android-malware/.
[44] O. Mamedov, F. Sinitsyn, and A. Ivanov. (2017)
“Bad Rabbit ransomware”. Available: securelist.com/
bad-rabbit-ransomware/82851/.
[45] [Online]. Available: www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/
comments/1o53hl/disturbing bitcoin virus encrypts
instead of/
[46] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/virus-
removal/cryptolocker-ransomware-information#bitcoin
[47] Symantec Security Response Team. (2014) “CryptoDe-
fense, the CryptoLocker Imitator, Makes Over $34,000
in One Month”. Available: www.symantec.com/
connect/blogs/cryptodefense-cryptolocker-imitator-
makes-over-34000-one-month.
[48] [Online]. Available: malwaretips.com/blogs/remove-
cryptowall-4-0-virus/
[49] [Online]. Available:
researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2014/10/tracking-
new-ransomware-cryptowall-2-0/
[50] [Online]. Available: blog.rackspace.com/exploit-kits-
and-cryptowall-3-0
23
[51] [Online]. Available: blog.brillantit.com/cryptowall-3-0-
traffic-analysis/
[52] [Online]. Available: www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/
2015/06/04/index.html
[53] [Online]. Available: malware-traffic-analysis.net/2015/
06/09/index.html
[54] [Online]. Available: threatpost.com/cryptowall-3-
0-infections-spike-from-angler-ek-malicious-spam-
campaigns/113272/
[55] [Online]. Available: www.botfree.ro/articles/pages/en/
2015-05-22-article-cryptowall-3-0.html
[56] [Online]. Available: www.2-spyware.com/remove-
cryptowall-virus.html
[57] [Online]. Available: www.enigmasoftware.com/
cryptowallransomware-removal/
[58] [Online]. Available: www.securitystronghold.com/
gates/remove-rig-exploit-kit.html
[59] [Online]. Available: phishme.com/inside-look-dropbox-
phishing-cryptowall-bitcoins/
[60] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
qxAB0P-hXoo
[61] [Online]. Available: dfwci.com/blog4/sky-is-falling/
[62] [Online]. Available: blog.malwarebytes.com/
cybercrime/malware/2017/05/stolen-version-dma-
locker-making-rounds/
[63] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/
security/dma-locker-ransomware-targets-unmapped-
network-shares/
[64] [Online]. Available: zaufanatrzeciastrona.pl/post/
dma-locker-czyli-komicznie-nieudany-i-pelen-bledow-
polski-ransomware/
[65] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
pgvhwFw61QY
[66] [Online]. Available: blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-
analysis/2016/02/dma-locker-a-new-ransomware-but-
no-reason-to-panic/
[67] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
8AT95CH7oXo
[68] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/
security/petya-ransomware-returns-with-goldeneye-
version-continuing-james-bond-theme/
[69] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
g1jdvY6iGSs
[70] [Online]. Available: www.digitalxraid.com/goldeneye-
ransomware/
[71] [Online]. Available: securelist.com/
expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-wiper-not-ransomware/
78902/
[72] [Online]. Available: blogs.systweak.com/2016/03/are-
apple-computers-virus-free/
[73] [Online]. Available: www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/
07/new-mac-ransomware-appears-keranger-spread-via-
transmission-app/
[74] [Online]. Available: itech-master.ru/keranger-
ransomware-for-os-x/
[75] [Online]. Available: www.cleaningpcmalware.com/
delete-keword-keranger-ransomware-removal-guide-
to-remove-from-mac
[76] [Online]. Available: nymag.com/selectall/2016/03/how-
to-check-for-keranger-transimission-ransomware.html
[77] [Online]. Available: blog.checkpoint.com/2016/03/10/
threat-alert-keranger-mac-osx-ransomware/
[78] [Online]. Available: securelist.com/wannacry-
ransomware-used-in-widespread-attacks-all-over-the-
world/78351/
[79] [Online]. Available: www.2-spyware.com/remove-ctb-
locker-virus.html
[80] [Online]. Available: thehackernews.com/2016/02/ctb-
locker-ransomware.html
[81] [Online]. Available: www.kaspersky.com/blog/ctb-
locker-strikes-web-servers/11593/
[82] [Online]. Available: www.supprimer-virus.com/ctb-
locker/
[83] [Online]. Available: malware.dontneedcoffee.com/
2014/07/ctb-locker.html?showComment=
1432541679251
[84] [Online]. Available: blog.sucuri.net/2016/04/website-
ransomware-ctb-locker-goes-blockchain.html
[85] [Online]. Available: www.symantec.com/
security response/earthlink writeup.jsp?docid=
2015-020521-0805-99
[86] [Online]. Available: www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/20/
teslacrypt ransomware scam dissected/
[87] [Online]. Available: news.sophos.com/en-us/2016/01/
06/the-current-state-of-ransomware-teslacrypt/
[88] [Online]. Available: www.pcprofessionale.it/howto/
recuperare-file-da-teslacrypt/
[89] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
a5bb6llKogg
[90] [Online]. Available: blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-
analysis/2015/12/inside-chimera-ransomware-the-first-
doxingware-in-wild/
[91] [Online]. Available: reaqta.com/2015/11/diving-into-
chimera-ransomware/
[92] [Online]. Available: www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/
9542-chimera-ransomware
[93] [Online]. Available: twitter.com/siri urz/status/
646602635836059648
[94] [Online]. Available: under-linux.org/content.php?r=
9775-Chimera-Praga-Fortalece-Cepas-de-
Ransomware-em-Plena-Ascens%C3%A3o&s=
bd565630571b71912e504bed26a080f1
[95] [Online]. Available: www.spywaretechs.com/remove-
hi-buddy-ransomware/
[96] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/
news/security/jigsaw-ransomware-decrypted-will-
delete-your-files-until-you-pay-the-ransom/
[97] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/
news/security/we-are-anonymous-jigsaw-ransomware-
variant-discovered/
[98] [Online]. Available: arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2016/06/meet-jigsaw-the-ransomware-that-
taunts-victims-and-offers-live-support/
[99] [Online]. Available: sensorstechforum.com/crypte-file-
virus-jigsaw-ransomware-remove-restore-files/
[100] [Online]. Available: blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-
24
security-intelligence/jigsaw-ransomware-plays-games-
victims/
[101] [Online]. Available: www.welivesecurity.com/2016/
04/28/ransomware-is-everywhere-but-even-black-hats-
make-mistakes/
[102] [Online]. Available: twitter.com/jakubkroustek/status/
842848265045528576
[103] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
aZmK7K3Q9t4
[104] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
PyOMKC-h2Ug
[105] [Online]. Available: www.avast.com/ransomware-
decryption-tools
[106] [Online]. Available: www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/
9942-fun-ransomware
[107] [Online]. Available: blogs.technet.microsoft.com/
mmpc/2016/05/26/link-lnk-to-ransom/
[108] [Online]. Available: www.kaspersky.com/blog/
zcryptor-ransomware/12268/
[109] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
qh46XQ0BUY
[110] [Online]. Available: www.youtube.com/watch?v=
dlovpo3XS4o
[111] [Online]. Available: www.briteccomputers.co.uk/posts/
11342/
[112] [Online]. Available: www.nyxbone.com/malware/
venusLocker.html
[113] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/
news/security/new-trump-locker-ransomware-is-a-
fraud-just-venuslocker-in-disguise/
[114] [Online]. Available: www.bleepingcomputer.com/
news/security/new-lltp-ransomware-appears-to-be-a-
rewritten-venus-locker/
[115] [Online]. Available: it-help.info/how-to/malwares/
3379-how-to-remove-thundercrypt-ransomware-and-
restore-files
[116] [Online]. Available: www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/
11245-thundercrypt-ransomware
[117] [Online]. Available: www.channel8news.sg/
news8/latestnews/20170514-wld-tw-ransomware/
3715038.html?cid=ch8news-fb
[118] [Online]. Available: www.symantec.com/connect/
articles/ransomware-and-other-threats-high-risks-
android-devices
[119] [Online]. Available: www.group-ib.com/blog/badrabbit
Mauro Conti received the Ph.D. degree from
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, in 2009. He is
an Associate Professor with the University of Padua,
Italy. He was a Post-Doctoral Researcher with Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He was
a recipient of the Marie Curie Fellowship (2012)
by the European Commission, and a Fellowship
by the German DAAD (2013). His main research
interest is in the area of security and privacy. In
this area, he published over 170 papers in topmost
international peer-reviewed journals and conference.
He is an Associate Editor for several journals, including the IEEE COMMU-
NICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS and the IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY. He was a Program
Chair for TRUST 2015, ICISS 2016, WiSec 2017, and the General Chair
for SecureComm 2012 and ACM SACMAT 2013.
Ankit Gangwal received the B.Tech. degree in
Information Technology from RTU, Kota, India in
2011 and the M.Tech. degree in Computer Engineer-
ing from Malaviya National Institute of Technology,
Jaipur, India in 2016. Currently, he is a Ph.D.
student in the Department of Mathematics, Univer-
sity of Padua, Padua, Italy with a fellowship for
international students funded by Fondazione Cassa
di Risparmio di Padova e Rovigo (CARIPARO).
His current research interest is in the area of security
and privacy of blockchain technology and novel
networking architectures, in particular, software-defined networking.
Sushmita Ruj received her B.E. in Computer Sci-
ence from Bengal Engineering and Science Univer-
sity, Shibpur, India in 2004, and Masters and Ph.D.
in Computer Science from Indian Statistical Insti-
tute, India in 2006 and 2010, respectively. She was
a Erasmus Mundus Post Doctoral Fellow at Lund
University, Sweden and Post Doctoral Fellow at Uni-
versity of Ottawa, Canada. She is currently an Assis-
tant Professor at Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata,
India. Prior to this, she was an Assistant Professor
at IIT, Indore. She was a visiting researcher at
INRIA, France, University of Wollongong, Australia, Kyushu University,
Japan and Microsoft Research Labs, India. Her research interests are in
applied cryptography, security, combinatorics and complex network analysis.
She works in mobile ad hoc networks, vehicular networks, cloud security,
security in smart grids. She has served as program co-chair of IEEE ICCC
(P&STrack), IEEE ICDCS, IEEE ICC, etc and served on many TPCs. She
won a Samsung GRO award in 2014. Sushmita is a Senior Member of IEEE.
